Unraveling over time by Ambühl, Sandro & Groves, Vivienne
 6739 
2017 
November 2017 
 
Unraveling Over Time 
Sandro Ambuehl, Vivienne Groves 
 
Impressum: 
 
CESifo Working Papers 
ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version) 
Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research ‐ CESifo 
GmbH 
The international platform of Ludwigs‐Maximilians University’s Center for Economic Studies 
and the ifo Institute 
Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany 
Telephone +49 (0)89 2180‐2740, Telefax +49 (0)89 2180‐17845, email office@cesifo.de 
Editors: Clemens Fuest, Oliver Falck, Jasmin Gröschl 
www.cesifo‐group.org/wp 
  
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
∙ from the SSRN website:           www.SSRN.com 
∙ from the RePEc website:          www.RePEc.org 
∙ from the CESifo website:         www.CESifo‐group.org/wp 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6739 
Category 4: Labour Markets 
 
 
 
Unraveling Over Time 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, is a pervasive 
phenomenon in entry-level labor markets that leads to hiring decisions based on severely 
incomplete information. We provide a model of unraveling in one-to-one matching markets for 
prestigious positions. Its distinguishing feature is that the market operates over an extended time 
period during which information about potential matches arrives gradually. We find that 
unraveling causes potentially thick markets to spread thinly over a long time period. In 
equilibrium, an employers desirability is correlated neither with the time at which they hire, nor 
with the expected productivity of their matched worker. Unraveling thus significantly 
redistributes welfare among employers compared to a pairwise stable match. We study policies 
that manipulate the availability of information about students and show that they are effective 
only if they provide a sudden surge in information. Our main application is the market for U.S. 
federal appellate court clerks, a significant input into the efficiency of the justice system. 
Consistent with the model, hiring times in our dataset are spread over a period of six months and 
are uncorrelated with the desirability of a judge as an employer. 
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1 Introduction
Entry-level labor markets frequently suffer from the excessively early matching of workers to
employers, a phenomenon known as unraveling (Roth and Xing, 1994). Faced with a cohort
of prospective employees all graduating at similar points in time, some employers attempt
to eschew competition by hiring promising students early. By doing so, these employers
diminish the pool of applicants available for hire after graduation, prompting others to
hire promising students early, too. The resulting mutual undercutting frequently leads to
frenzied and chaotic markets, and to hires made up to multiple years before employment
starts, to the dismay of many market participants.
An important example is the market for federal judicial law clerks, our main application
in this paper.1 Judges depend heavily on their law clerks (Avery et al., 2001); their role
includes everything from the management of disputes in district courts to the drafting of
opinions at the U.S. Supreme Court (Bonica et al., 2017).2 Hence, an efficient selection and
matching of clerks to judges is a significant input into the efficiency of the federal justice
system.
In this paper, we develop a formal model of unraveling in a two-sided matching market.
We have two objectives. First, we aim to illuminate the mechanisms and determinants of
unraveling. The market we study takes place over an extended time period during which
information about potential employees evolves gradually. For employers, equilibrium behav-
ior thus involves balancing the benefits from waiting for better information before making
a hiring decision against the increased competition they would face for remaining in the
market at later points in time. We show that equilibrium hiring times are widely dispersed
across time, that unraveling acts as a powerful redistributive device among employers, and
that a potential employer’s attractiveness is uncorrelated with the point in time at which
they hire. Our model thus contrasts with the previous literature on unraveling, in terms
of both assumptions and results. That literature almost exclusively considers models with
1Other examples of unraveling in entry-level labor markets include clinical psychology internships, dental
residencies, optometry residencies and Japanese university graduates (Roth and Xing, 1994). More recently,
unraveling has also been observed in the market for entry-level private equity bankers (Alden, 2014), for
technology jobs (Ante, 2012), for faculty in philosophy departments (Kueppers, 2016), for postdoctoral
positions in theoretical physics (Yu, 2017), for college athletes (Popper, 2014), for professional soccer players
(Hautmann, 2013), and in several medical subspecialties such as the epilepsy and clinical neurophysiology
fellowships (Vidaurre and Campbell, 2017).
2Also judges’ decisions on matters such as whether to file a separate opinion or to dissent in a case are
based upon the support they anticipate from their clerks. Moreover, law clerks are essentially the only
persons a judge can talk to in depth about a case (Wald, 1990).
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two periods, an assumption that severely restricts the opportunities for avoiding competi-
tion. For a subset of the literature’s results, our model helps clarify which are robust, and
which are artifacts of the two-period restriction. Additionally, we show how the apparent
stark distinctness of models of unraveling (Halaburda, 2010; Du and Livne, 2013) can be
understood as extremes on a continuum.
Second, we hone policy tools to address unraveling. We focus on policies that vary
the way in which information about students is divulged into to the market. Our main
insight is that such policies have an effect on the resulting match only if they induce the
release a sufficiently large amount of information about students at a single instant in
time. Otherwise, the policy might not only be ineffective, but even exacerbate unraveling.
Studying such policies is important in spite of the sizable literature focused with matching
algorithms run by centralized clearinghouses, for two reasons. On the one hand, centralized
clearinghouses are sometimes repudiated, as is the case in the market for law clerks. On
the other hand, even markets with centralized clearinghouses sometimes unravel (Roth and
Xing, 1994; Niederle et al., 2006).
To provide an empirical illustration of our model, we gather data from an internet
discussion forum about the dates at which federal appellate judges hired law clerks for
positions starting in the Fall of 2009.3 Consistent with our model, hiring times are widely
dispersed over a period of six months. To proxy for a judge’s attractiveness as an employer,
we use the number of students the judge has been able to place in Supreme Court clerkship
positions between 1998 and 2008. As predicted, we find no relationship between this variable
and the point in time at which the judge makes clerk hires.
A handful of previous papers model unraveling in two-sided matching markets. They
are almost exclusively set in two periods. Specific to the market for law clerks, Haruvy
et al. (2006) use laboratory experiments and computational methods to investigate proposed
reforms in this market. The authors conclude that the feeling amongst students and judges
that students cannot reject offers results in inefficiency in the market. Our model takes this
restriction as a starting point. In contrast to both our and most other models of unraveling,
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) endogenize information revelation, and show that schools
may prevent unraveling by disclosing just the right amount of information about students.
3Official data are not available. According to the Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan which was in effect until
2013, judges were not supposed hire students before a set deadline. Hence, data about the points in time
at which judges hire students would be a documentation of judge rulebreaking.
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Other models each investigate a distinct aspect of unraveling. Halaburda (2010) shows
that the likelihood of unraveling increases with respect to the similarity of participants’
preferences. In Du and Livne (2013)’s model, approximately one quarter of participants
have strict incentives to unravel as the market grows large, but this unraveling can be
avoided by introducing transfer payments. Niederle et al. (2013) show how unraveling
depends on imbalances in the demand and supply of applicants. Fainmesser (2013) studies a
model in which information about market participants travels through a network of informal
connections, and investigates the comparative statics of unraveling as a function of the
structure of that network. Echenique and Pereyra (2016) precisely calculate the extent
to which strategic unraveling pushes employers to hire early. Pan (2017) characterizes
conditions on labor market characteristics and information structures that increase the
chance of exploding offers.4
More generally, Doval (2017) and Kadam and Kotowski (2017) study stability notions in
two-period models. Finally, a separate strand of the literature, starting with Li and Rosen
(1998), studies unraveling in matching markets with transfers (Suen, 2000; Li and Suen,
2000, 2004; Du and Livne, 2013). In these models, early contracting may provide insurance
to risk averse workers who face uncertainty about market conditions in the second period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview
of the market for law clerks as it relates to our model. Sections 3 sets up the model. Section
4 characterizes all equilibria of our model and analyzes comparative statics and welfare
implications. Section 5 contains our empirical illustration of the hiring process for clerks to
federal appellate judges. Section 6 studies policy proposals intended to alleviate unraveling.
Section 7 formally compares our model to existing two-period models of unraveling. Finally,
Section 8 concludes.5 All mathematical proofs are in Appendix D.
2 The Market for Clerks to Federal Appellate Judges
Each year, students in law schools across the U.S. seek one of a small number of clerkship
positions with a federal appellate judge. From the viewpoint of students, this is a highly elite
4Unlike these models, Damiano et al. (2005) set up a model in which unraveling is not associated with
informational costs.
5Additionally, Appendix A presents an extension of the model in which students are allowed to reject
offers, and an extension that shows the robustness regarding an alternative informational assumption. Ap-
pendix B is a numerical simulation of our model, and Appendix C describes our empirical data.
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market. Federal appellate clerkships are the most prestigious of judicial clerkships available
to new J.D. graduates, and are the toughest to obtain.6 Nonetheless, some clerkships
are more desirable than others. Judges differ in the extent to which they are involved in
training clerks, so the choice of clerkship can have a significant impact on a clerk’s further
career development (Kozinski, 1991). Indeed, some judges have a reputation as feeders of
clerks to the Supreme Court, and are regarded as particularly desirable employers.7 Our
empirical illustration in Section 5 relies on this fact to show the relationship between a
judge’s desirability as an employer and his or her clerk hiring time.
Also from the viewpoint of judges, finding good law clerks is vital. Having a talented staff
of clerks is a major component of a their productivity, potentially making “the difference
between a bad year and a wonderful one” (Kozinski, 1991). Judges thus compete fiercely
for the best and brightest students in a cohort, often by asking students to sign a contract
before they may consider offers from other judges.
As a result, the market for law clerks has suffered from unraveling for multiple decades.
Both students and judges frequently complain about its chaotic and unpredictable nature.
Repeated attempts to reform the market have invariably failed. Most recently, the Federal
Law Clerk Hiring plan (or “Hiring Plan”), instituted in 2005 and officially abandoned in
November 2013, was an attempt to coordinate the hiring process to begin no earlier than
an agreed upon date (Online System for Clerkship Application and Review, 2013b).8
Our model matches three characteristics of this particular market, the first two of which
are also present in many other entry-level labor markets. First, salaries are fixed and not
negotiable. In the case of law clerks, this is stipulated by the Judicial Salary Plan.9
6Clerkship positions at federal appellate courts represent a small fraction of all judicial clerkship positions;
about 10% of federal judges are at federal appellate courts (Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
2013).
7Many law school graduates view a clerkship at the Supreme Court as the ultimate achievement (Morse,
2014). These positions are more limited and more highly prized than clerkships with appellate judges. A
lawyer who has committed to an appellate clerkship can command a signing bonus from law firms of up to
$60,000 (Lat, 2011). Students transitioning from a role as Supreme Court clerk to an associate at a major
law firm have been known to receive signing bonuses of up to $300,000 (Lat, 2013b).
8Adherence to the plan deteriorated as prestigious schools such as Harvard felt that such adherence
placed students at a disadvantage and became lax in its enforcement (Lat, 2013a; Kramer, 2013).
9While fixed salaries imply that competitive pressure must be released through a channel other than
transferrable utility, it is not true that allowing for flexible salaries would alleviate unraveling. There are
many markets with flexible salaries that nonetheless unravel, such as the market for entry-level employees
with J.D. degrees at elite law firms (Ginsburg and Wolf, 2003). For each recent cohort, there was a single
salary ($160k in 2011) offered by the vast majority of elite law firms (Collins, 2012), rendering that market
into one of de facto fixed salaries.
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Second, information about students arrives gradually. Time to graduation in a J.D. pro-
gram is three years and includes a large number of exams and evaluations, which progres-
sively offer information about students. Judge Kozinski (1991) articulates the fundamental
tradeoff: “Time ... can buy more information, reducing uncertainty. But the cost of delay
may be the loss of opportunity, as some candidates receive offers from judges who believe
they can make reasoned judgments on the basis of less information”.10
Third, students feel pressured to accept any offer they might receive (Haruvy et al.,
2006; Avery et al., 2001). Law career counselors reason that “one can never tell how far the
wrath of a judge scorned will extend and exactly what the consequences will be, for you or
for others” (Strauss, 2015). Indeed, the very act of turning down an offer may jeopardize
chances for an offer from another judge. Strauss (2015) exhorts students to avoid declining
any offer “merely as a matter of strategy with the expectation of receiving an offer from
another judge”.11 Systematic survey evidence confirms the prevalence of this norm. In
the year 2000, the most recent year for which such data are available, 73% of the students
accepted the first offer they received (Avery et al., 2001).12
Reluctance to reject offers is arguably an idiosyncratic feature of the market for law
clerks. Nonetheless, one can view it as an approximation to markets with a segment of elite
employers if students are much more concerned about matching to one of the elite employers
at all than to which of them they match to. In this case, they will be reluctant to refuse
offers by elite employers, simply for strategic reasons.
3 Model Setup
In this section we introduce our formal model. A discussion of our assumptions follows.
Environment. We study a two-sided, one-to-one matching market without transfers.
There are J ≥ 2 employers and I students. The number of students exceeds the number
of employers, I > J . Each employer can hire exactly one student. We think of T > 0 as
the start date of employment. Each student i is identified with a skill level qi(t), given
10Kozinski (1991) lists specific pieces of information that, if available, are relevant to a judge’s hiring
decision.
11Additional evidence can be found in the recommendations of Yale Law School’s Career Development
Office, which highlight the extreme asymmetry of the judge-student relationship. Applicants are urged not
to ask questions regarding the judge’s policies on hours of work, vacation, or post-clerkship jobs lest they
diminish their chances of receiving an offer (Yale Law School Career Development Office, 2008).
12There is evidence that students can be more strategic in their decisions which judges to apply to, and
in accepting or avoiding phone calls (Avery et al., 2001). Our model will abstract from such behavior.
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by an independent standard Brownian motion, with qi(0) = 0 evolving over time interval
[0, T ]. Hence, predicting what a student’s skill level will be at time T becomes easier as
time progresses.
Preferences. Maximizing production is the employers’ sole concern. Employer j’s
production is given by vj = αjqi(T ), with αj > 0 for all j. That is, employer j’s production
is proportional to the matched student’s skill level at time T , qi(T ). Hence, any employer
who hires a student before the employment start date T needs to predict the expected skill
level the student will attain by that point in time. The vector of parameters (αj)j allows
us to capture complementarity or substitutability between students and employers. If αj is
larger for more desirable employers, student skill and employer desirability are complements.
They are substitutes if αj decreases with employer desirability. Employers not matched with
a student receive payoff z, which we assume to be less than the ex-ante expected payoff that
can be obtained from hiring the J-best student at time T . This assumption ensures that all
employers will hire a student.
We assume that students have common preferences over employers. Specifically, each
student prefers employer 1 to employer 2 to employer 3, and so on, and we say that employer
1 is more desirable than employer 2 who is in turn more desirable than employer 3, and
so forth. While we frequently use language such as “least desirable employer” throughout
this paper, we emphasize that this is a relative term in the context of a market consisting
entirely of employers whose positions are so attractive that each student prefers them to
outside options.
Actions and matching. At each time t ∈ [0, T ] employers must decide whether to
remain in the market or exit the market by hiring a student. All matchings are binding for
both sides. Students choose between employers if they receive multiple job offers at the same
time. Otherwise, they must accept any job offer they receive.13 The assumption of choosing
between simultaneous offers is not vacuous since equilibrium incentives lead employers to
act at the same points in time.14
Formally, at any moment in time t ∈ [0, T ] an employer can either stay in the market
by choosing action s (“stay”) or exit by choosing one of the actions in E = {e1, . . . , eI}
(“exit” by employing a student). If, at time t, an employer is the only one to play some
action e ∈ E, this employer is automatically assigned the student whose skill level is, at
13This assumption is arguably factually accurate in the market for law clerks; see Section 2.
14We study the effects of relaxing the no-rejections assumption in Appendix A.1.
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time t, highest out of the students who have yet to sign an employment contract. If more
than one employer attempts to exit at the same time t, students are matched to employers
assortatively. An employer’s choice of ek indicates willingness to accept any student ranked
k or higher amongst those who are still available, and prefers to stay in the game otherwise.
Overall, this matching procedure embodies the assumption that a student may reject an
offer by an employer if the student simultaneously receives an offer by a more desirable
employer.15
Information. Employers’ decisions are informed by the properties of the stochastic
process according to which students’ skill levels evolve. These are common knowledge, as
are all players’ past actions. Employers, however, do not observe the current realization of
the student skill level qi(t) at any t ≤ T . Employers can nonetheless infer the expected skill
level obtained when they exit the game at any time t, conditional on the points in time
t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tk at which previous employers have exited. This assumption renders the model
a game of complete and perfect information.16
We use the expression xk+1(t|t1, . . . , tk) to denote the skill level an employer expects from
hiring the best available student at time t given the previous hire times of other employers
t1, . . . , tk. Observe that this notation allows us to capture the expected payoffs accruing to
different employers even if they exit the market at the same point in time. For instance,
if no employer has exited so far, and both employers 1 and employer 2 exit at t, then the
more desirable employer 1 expects student skill level x1(t) and the less desirable employer
2 expects student skill level x2(t|t).
Histories, strategies, and equilibrium. A history, Ht, of the game up to time t
describes what action has been taken by which player at what time up to, but excluding,
time t. The history of the game is common knowledge. We let H denote the set of histories
and we use the symbol ∅ to denote the empty history.
Intuitively, we think of a strategy as a plan that specifies the probability with which
an employer takes a given action at any given point in time, depending on the actions
previously taken by other employers. Formally, a pure strategy of an employer j is a function
σj : H→ E∪{s} that maps a history Ht into an action taken at time t. We write σj(Ht) = a
to refer to a strategy in which employer j plays action a at time t with probability 1. We
15Technically, this matching is derived from a serial dictatorship mechanism in which priority order is
determined by the participating employers’ desirability.
16We study the effects of relaxing this Assumption in appendix A.2.
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require that any interval of time during which an employer plays some action e ∈ E is closed
on the left. This condition, which we call right-continuity, ensures that in any strategy
profile there is a well-defined first point in time at which an employer exits the game. We
emphasize that we do allow for mixed strategies. Since all equilibrium outcomes of interest
can be obtained through pure strategy profiles, however, we defer the formalization of mixed
strategies to Appendix D.
We derive our main result using subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as a solution concept,
and also consider the limit of subgame perfect -equilibria for  approaching 0.17
Discussion of assumptions
Interpretation of qi(t). Employers in our model are concerned with predicting the skill
level that their prospective student hire will have on the start date of employment, T . Hence,
our results are unchanged if we alter the process by which students’ skill levels evolve in
fully predictable ways, and in the same fashion for each student. For instance, our model
can accommodate periods in time during which information arrives more quickly than usual
(for instance the months during which many schools begin publicizing second year grades),
as long as the release of a large amount of information is not concentrated on a single point
in time.
Whether qi(t) represents information about skill that is learned in the moment, or
whether it reflects gradually uncovered information about pre-existing differences in ability,
is immaterial to our analysis. Similarly, qi(T ) can be interpreted as a prediction of the
student’s expected productivity over the course of the match or, alternatively, as some ob-
jective measure of ability at that point in time, without any implications for the remaining
elements of our analysis.
Imperfect information about qi(t). We assume that employers do not observe time t
student skill levels qi(t) for reasons of tractability. Two further justifications are: First, our
informational assumptions are a generalization of those in Halaburda (2010).18 Second, we
regard this assumption as plausible. If employers had perfect information, they would base
their decisions not on the absolute skill levels, but on the difference between the skill levels
of students of different ranks. It is not obvious that having perfect information about the
17For any  > 0, a strategy profile σ is an -equilibrium if no player can gain more than  by unilaterally
deviating from his strategy.
18In that model, I students who are undifferentiated in the first period are randomly assigned one of
I fixed values in the second period. In our setup, students are undifferentiated at t = 0, expected skills
conditional on rank j at time T are given by xj(T |T, . . . , T ), and ranks are assigned randomly.
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difference in skill levels between two students would be a more plausible assumption than
having no information other than the relative ranking of the students, especially if these
two students are, for instance, the best student at Yale and the best student at Stanford.
Continuity of qi(t). In our model, information arrives continuously. Appendix A.3 shows
that our substantive results are unchanged if information were to arrive in small discrete
amounts. Analyzing the model as a sequence of discrete time games, one obtains, in the limit,
the same set of equilibria as by directly using the continuous time formulation. Relatedly,
in Sections 6.2 and 7 we study how the model changes when a large amount of information
is released at a predictable point in time.
Student welfare. Because students in our model are ex-ante identical, they all face
equal chances of matching to any given employer. Hence, their ex-ante expected welfare is
independent of the way in which the market allocates students to employers.19
Student investment. Our model abstracts from human capital investment by students,
which, in principle, might depend on the efficiency of the match and on the timing of the
market. In the only related empirical study, using the market for college graduates in Japan,
Okudaira (2017) finds that a guideline revision that successfully delayed the timing of job
searches had no positive effect on students’ human capital investment.
Employer desirability. All of our results continue to hold if higher ranking employers
merely face a higher probability of being assigned better students when placed in direct
competition with other employers.
4 Analysis
Our model is intuitive, and can be illustrated graphically, when there are only two employers.
We discuss this case before we analyze the general model.
4.1 Intuitive Solution with Two Employers
Consider a market with two employers (let us call them employer 1 and employer 2), and
at least four students.20 Equilibria in our model are characterized by the points in time at
which employers exit the market. Employers have no reason to exit the market early if there
19Note, however, from the time that students are differentiated, the rules of the market will affect the
expected welfare of the students.
20This latter assumption ensures that t1, as defined below, is strictly positive.
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is no competition, but they do benefit from information that arises over time. Hence, once
one of the two employers has exited the market, the remaining employer will remain in the
market until time T . This employer can then hire the best of the remaining students with
all pertinent information available. Thus, in any equilibrium, the second hire will be made
at T . Therefore, we only need to characterize the point in time at which the first student is
hired.
Figure 1 plots the time at which the first hire is made on the horizontal axis, and the
student skill level an employer can expect to obtain from a particular strategy on the vertical
axis. The employer who is first to hire a student and does so at t can expect the student to
have skill level x1(t) at time T . This expectation is increasing in t: The closer t is to T , the
higher is the likelihood that the student who was the most skilled at t will still be the most
skilled at T .
The point in time t at which the first hire is made also affects the skill level x2(T |t) that
the employer 2, who is second to hire, can expect at time T : The longer employer 1 stays
before exiting, the greater is the chance that the student who is most highly skilled at T
will be unavailable for employer 2. In this case, employer will have to settle for the student
who is second-best at T . Hence, x2(T |t) is decreasing in t.
The two curves x1(t) and x2(T |t) cross. This is because at a very early points in time, it
is difficult to predict which student will eventually be the most skilled. By hiring the student
who is ranked first at such an early point in time, an employer cannot expect a payoff that
is much higher than if he were to hire a randomly chosen student. If employer 1 were to do
this, the probability is high that the student who eventually attains the highest skill level
at time T will still available for employer 2. Hence, the strategy of waiting until T to hire
the best remaining student yields a higher payoff than the strategy of making the first hire
at very early points in time. Thus, for low t, we have x1(t) < x2(T |t). On the other hand,
if employer 1 waits until some late point in time to hire the first student (and employer 2
chooses not to preempt him by hiring first instead), employer 2 will likely have to settle for
the student who is ranked second at T . Thus, for high values of t we have x1(t) > x2(T |t).
Let t∗1 mark the point in time at which the two curves cross. Clearly, the first hire will
not be made before t∗1. At such early points in time, waiting beats exiting. On the other
hand, there cannot be an equilibrium in which both employers postpone hiring until strictly
after t∗1. At such late points in time, exiting beats waiting. Hence, if an employer were
10
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Figure 1: The model with two employers. The horizontal axis plots time t. x1(t) is the
student skill level an employer expects to obtain if he hires a student at time t, given that no
other student has been hired before. x2(T |t) is the student skill level an employer expects
to obtain if he hires a student at T , given that one student has previously been hired at
time t. In every equilibrium of the model, the first hire is made at t∗1, and the second hire
is made at T .
to employ a strategy of waiting until some t > t∗1, the opponent could profitably preempt
him. This leaves t∗1 as the only point in time at which the first student may be hired in
equilibrium.
There is an equilibrium in which the first employer exits at t∗1 and the second employer
waits until time T to exit. In this equilibrium, both employers attempt to exit by playing e1
at t∗1, and both employers receive the same expected payoff. No employer has an incentive
to deviate: exiting before t∗1 is not profitable because at these early points in time, waiting
beats exiting. Moreover, failure to play e1 at t
∗
1 does not change either employer’s expected
payoff. Doing so will only cause one’s opponent to exit at t∗1, thus leaving the employer with
payoff x2(T |t1) = x1(t1). Finally, no employer has an incentive to deviate from remaining
in the market until time T if the opponent was the first to hire at t∗1, because the loss of
information associated with exiting earlier will decrease the expected payoff.
Thus, unraveling proceeds to a point in time that is just early enough for both employers
to expect to be matched to a student of the same skill level, regardless of whether they are
first or second to exit the market. This is true in spite of the fact that both employers make
an offer to the same student at the same point in time, and despite the fact that employer
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1 is more desirable than employer 2. Our setup allows employers to avoid competition to
such an extent that any advantage the more desirable employer might have when placed in
direct competition with the less desirable employer is completely eroded.
In the equilibrium just discussed, the more desirable employer hires first. Yet, t∗1 is
defined such that each employer gets the same expected payoff, regardless of whether the
employer exits at t∗1 or at T . This raises the question of whether there is an equilibrium in
which the less desirable employer exits first. In addition to presenting the full version of the
model, the next section shows that under the appropriate equilibrium concept, our model
indeed leaves the order of hiring undetermined.
4.2 Equilibrium Behavior
We now show that the intuition developed above extends to the case of arbitrarily many em-
ployers. We then consider the effects of unraveling on total production, and the comparative
statics of unraveling with respect to the number of employers.
We begin the analysis by characterizing the employers’ payoff functions, which are pro-
portional to xk+1(t|t1, . . . , tk). Recall that this expression denotes the expectation of the
skill level that student i will have at the start date of employment T if i is the most highly
skilled student at t amongst all students still available at t, given that at each previous time
t1, . . . , tk an employer exited the market by hiring the respective best available student.
Proposition 1. For all 0 ≤ k ≤ J − 1 and all t ≥ tk ≥ . . . ≥ t1 , the conditional
expectation xk+1(t|t1, . . . , tk) is
(i) jointly continuous in all arguments,
(ii) strictly increasing in t,
(iii) weakly decreasing in t1, . . . , tk.
Moreover,
(iv) for all t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tJ with tk < T for some k, we have
∑
k xk(tk|t1, . . . , tk−1) <∑
k xk(T |T, . . . , T )
(v) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ J−1, τ1 ≤ . . . ≤ τk with t1 > 0, and t ≥ tk, we have xk+1(t|t1, . . . , tk) <
xk(t|t1, . . . , tk−1)
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Property (i) captures the intuition that information arrives gradually. It does not hold for
a process in which students’ skill levels jump with positive probability at some known or
predetermined time. Property (ii) arises because predicting farther into the future is more
difficult. The closer t is to the start date of employment, T , the higher the probability
that the student who is deemed best at time t will still be ranked highly at T . As a
natural analogue, we obtain property (iii). The earlier an employer’s rivals hire, the more
likely the hired students have dropped in rank by time t, and hence the better the pool of
remaining students from which the employer can choose. Property (iv) states that unraveling
is inefficient from the employers’ point of view. If hirings are made early, then there is a
positive probability that some employer will be matched to a student whose rank at T is
lower than J . Such a student would not be hired at all if all employers postponed hiring
until T . Finally, the expected payoff of an employer who exits at time t decreases with
the number of students that have already matched to other employers. This intuition is
formalized in property (v). It is only through these properties that all of our subsequent
results depend on the process of student skill evolution. Hence they hold for any stochastic
process for which Proposition 1 can be derived.
Within each subgame, equilibrium strategies are characterized by the points in time at
which employers will rationally exit the market. For each history Ht in which k employers
have exited, the subgame hiring times tk+1(Ht), . . . , tJ(Ht) are a set of points in time at
which employers will weakly prefer exiting to staying in the game (given that other employers
plan to do the same). They are defined by four properties.
First, the sole reason to hire before T is competition with other employers. Hence, if an
employer finds himself to be the only employer who has not yet hired a student, the employer
will wait to do so until time T when all pertinent information is available. Second, exiting at
a later subgame hiring time must not be more profitable than exiting at an earlier subgame
hiring time, as employers would then have an incentive to postpone hiring. Third, if all
future exits from the market occur at subgame hiring times, each employer is indifferent
between exiting at any of the (strictly) future subgame hiring times. Fourth, whenever
immediately hiring any of the m best available students is more profitable than remaining
in the game, many employers will attempt to exit the market immediately, resulting in a
hiring frenzy. Hiring frenzies may never be known to occur in the (strict) future: if they
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were, less desirable employers would have an incentive to hire the best available student just
before the hiring frenzy is known to take place.
The following definition states these properties formally.
Definition 1. (Subgame hiring times) Consider a history Ht with past hiring times h =
(t1, . . . , tk) that satisfies t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tk ≤ t. Then tk+1 ≤ . . . ≤ tJ are subgame hiring times
for Ht if they satisfy tk+1 ≥ t and
(i) tJ = T .
(ii) For all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , J − 1}:
xj(tj |h, tk+1, . . . , tj−1) ≥ xj+1(tj+1|h, tk+1, . . . , tj).
(iii) If t < tj < tj+1 for some j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , J − 1}, then xj(tj |h, tk+1, . . . , tj−1) =
xj+1(tj+1|h, tk+1, . . . , tj).
(iv) If tj = tj+1 for some j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , J − 1}, then tj+1 = t.
The set of equilibria in our game is small because the monotonicity of the conditional
expectation functions guarantees unique subgame hiring times for each history.
Lemma 1. For all k ∈ {0, . . . , J − 1} and for each history Ht in which k employers have
exited, there exists a unique vector of future subgame hiring times tk+1(Ht) ≤ . . . ≤ tJ(Ht).
We can now explicitly construct a pure strategy equilibrium profile σ. Employer j’s
strategy in this profile, σj , takes the following form.
Definition 2. (Equilibrium Strategies) A strategy σj for player j is an equilibrium strategy
if, for each t and for each history Ht with previous hiring times h = (t1, . . . , tk) that satisfy
t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tk ≤ t, employer j’s strategy satisfies
(i) σj(Ht) = s if t < tk+1(Ht).
(ii) σj(HT ) = eJ .
(iii) σj(Ht) = em if tk+1(Ht) = tk+m(Ht) = t and if
x(tk+m(Ht)|h, tk+1(Ht), . . . , tk+m−1(Ht)) > x(T |h, tk+1(Ht), . . . , tJ−1(Ht)).
(iv) σj(Ht) = s or σj(Ht) = e1 at any other subgame hiring time.
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Part (i) of this definition ensures that no employer exits at a time that is not a subgame
hiring time. Part (ii) ensures that employer j agrees to hire any student who is at least
J-best at T . Part (iii) requires that employer j attempts to exit the game whenever doing
so is strictly more profitable than remaining in the market (and thus participates in every
hiring frenzy in which that employer has a chance of employing a student). It also ensures
that at least one employer exits at each subgame hiring time: any attempt to postpone
hiring by  > 0 will be preempted by some other employer. Finally, by part (iv), employer
j may or may not attempt to hire a student at any other subgame hiring time.
The strategy profile σ is an equilibrium profile if the ambiguity in part (iv) is resolved
as follows: At each time t that coincides with l ≥ 1 subgame hiring times, the (l + 1) most
desirable remaining employers play action el. The (l + 1)st employer ensures that none of
the l employers who do exit have an incentive to postpone exiting by any (arbitrarily small)
amount of time.
The next proposition is our main result. Part (i) shows that σ is an subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) profile. Part (ii) shows that, in each SPE profile and each subgame,
students are hired at subgame hiring times. Hence, any equilibrium outcome of the game
has one employer exit at each subgame hiring time t1(∅), . . . , tJ(∅). We call these points in
time the equilibrium hiring times, and denote them by t∗1, . . . , t
∗
J .
It bears emphasis that proposition 2 holds true even though we allow players to play
mixed strategies.
Proposition 2.
(i) σ is an SPE profile.
(ii) In each SPE profile, students are hired at subgame hiring times in each subgame.
Testable implications. Proposition 2 implies that equilibrium hiring times will be
spread out.21 The extent of the dispersion in equilibrium hiring times is substantial: the
first employer exits the market strictly before the point in time at which hiring the best
21Under the assumptions of Section 3 no hiring frenzy will occur in equilibrium. A hiring frenzy may
occur, however, if a large amount of information becomes available at a predictable point in time. This
is the case, for instance, if a policy alters the release of information about students (see Section 6.2), or if
students are already sufficiently differentiated at t = 0.
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student would provide him with an expected payoff as large as randomly matching to one
of the J most highly skilled students at T .22
Additionally, all employers obtain a student with the same expected skill level, irrespec-
tive of their employer desirability rank (unless there is a hiring frenzy at t = 0). This drives
our result regarding the order in which employers exit the market. Since each employer is
indifferent between exiting at any equilibrium hiring time, any order of exit is consistent
with a limit of subgame perfect pure strategy -equilibria, for  approaching zero. (By con-
trast, if we reduce our model to two periods, and if the first period features little information
about students, as is the case in Halaburda (2010), we find that less desirable employers are
more likely than more desirable employers to hire in the first period. See Section 7.)
An important caveat to the above result is that the only order of exit consistent with
exact equilibrium has the most desirable employer exit first, followed by the second-most
desirable employer, and so on. This is an implication of the right-continuity of strategies.
By part (iii) of definition 2, an employer must attempt to exit the game whenever doing so is
strictly more profitable than the continuation strategy. By right-continuity, therefore, each
employer must also exit when doing so is weakly more profitable. Thus, at each point in
time, the most desirable remaining employer must exit at the next subgame hiring time.23
Because this implication on the order of exit derives from a purely technical condition (right-
continuity) rather than from a substantive assumption, we regard the anything-goes result
implied by limits of -equilibria as the main prediction of our model regarding the order of
exit. To demonstrate that our results are not an artifact of our particular continuous-time
formulation, Appendix A.3 re-derives the results using discrete time approximations for the
case of two employers.
Lastly, we find that increased competitive pressure exacerbates unraveling. If a larger
number of employers compete for the same set of students, then the jth student is hired at
an earlier point in time for all j.
Corollary 1. If there is no hiring frenzy at t = 0, then the following hold:
(i) Equilibrium hiring times are dispersed in time: t∗1 < . . . < t
∗
J .
22This follows from the fact that the first student is hired as soon as doing so yields the equilibrium
expected student skill level, and because the equilibrium expected student skill level is lower than that from
the random matching.
23-equilibrium allows us to circumvent this implication of right-continuity. A more desirable employer
nonetheless has a competitive advantage over less desirable one. Whenever desired, a more desirable employer
can exit at the same point in time as a less desirable employer, and thus preempt him.
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(ii) In any equilibrium, all employers obtain a student of the same expected skill level.
(iii) Any order of employers exiting the market is consistent with a limit of subgame perfect
pure strategy -equilibria, for  approaching zero. The unique order of employers exiting
the market consistent with exact equilibrium has the j-most desirable employer be the
jth to exit.
(iv) Consider an increase in the number of employers to J˜ > J . Let t˜∗1, . . . , t˜
∗
J˜
denote the
associated equilibrium hiring times. Then, t˜∗j < t
∗
j for all j = 1, . . . , J .
Distributional implications and total production In many markets, unraveling is
regarded as an undesirable state of affairs, and is often compared to a prisoner’s dilemma.
That comparison, however, is misleading, because unraveling is not Pareto inferior to a
positive assortative matching at T — the unique ex post pairwise stable match in our set-
ting. When employers and students are matched assortatively, the least desirable employer
matches to a student with expected skill level xJ(T |T, . . . , T ). In the unraveling equilib-
rium, the least desirable employer exits last, and because xJ(T |t1, . . . , tJ−1) is decreasing
over the previous hiring times t1, . . . , tJ−1, this least desirable employer obtains a strictly
higher payoff in an unravelled market than under assortative matching.
It is true that unraveling results in lower expected student skill levels for employers who
hire at T . Whether or not unraveling decreases the total output of the market, however,
would also depend on whether employer desirability and student skill are complements
or substitutes. While total production in the unraveling equilibrium does not depend on
substitutability,24 the assortative matching benchmark does. Positive assortative matching
maximizes production in the complements case, and minimizes it in the substitutes case.
With substitutes, any deviation from positive assortative matching increases production
(keeping the set of matched students unchanged); if substitutability is sufficiently strong
(that is, if αj increases with j sufficiently quickly.) this effect outweighs the loss in expected
student productivity caused by unraveling.25
Corollary 2.
24Expected total production in any unraveling equilibrium is given by E
[∑
j vj(qµ(j)(T ))
]
=
E
[
qµ(1)(T )
]∑
j aj , where µ(j) denotes the index of the student that employer j is matched to in a given
realization of an equilibrium.
25This result crucially depends on the absence of transfers.
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(i) Less desirable employers strictly prefer any unraveling equilibrium to a positive assor-
tative matching at T .
(ii) Production in positive assortative matching at T is higher than in any unraveling
equilibrium if student skills and employer desirability are complements, and lower if
they are sufficiently strong substitutes.
Whether the substitutes or the complements case better describes the market for law
clerks is an open empirical question.26
5 Data
We now present data from the 2008 market for law clerks. Consistent with our model,
hirings are indeed spread over time, and we find no relationship between judges’ desirability
and the point in time at which they hire students. We do not, however, interpret these
findings as a test of our model. The Hiring Plan was still in effect in 2008, and thus our
data may not represent equilibrium behavior.
Data We source our data from the “Clerkship Notification Blog”, a public internet forum
coordinated by law students (McDaniel et al., 2013), the central objective of which is to
divulge information about the timing of judicial clerkship hirings and interviews.27 It largely
consists of time-stamped entries such as “Ikuta has hired one HLS” or “Noonan is done”.28
While blog entries are anonymous, they are often seconded and mistakes based on hearsay
are frequently corrected. Often, they are written by current law clerks divulging inside
information.
Our data covers the hiring for positions starting in 2009, and contains information about
the hiring activity of 197 circuit judges. We restrict our data to statements of a judge hiring
a clerk or finishing the hiring process. (A judge may hire several clerks in a given year.)
This leaves us with 168 judges, which covers just over 80% of the 239 judges currently active
26The case of substitutes, however, is not merely a theoretical curiosity. Davis (2017) examines the
matching of teachers to schools with Teach For America. He examines the change in the matching procedure
from a first-offer mechanism, which induced some unraveling, to a deferred-acceptance algorithm. He finds
that while teacher retention increased (indicating that the new match outcomes better account for teacher
preferences), it lowers performance in the teachers’ first year.
27Official records on the points in time at which judges hire clerks do not exist, since judges who hire
earlier than the Hiring Plan date are breaking the very rule this plan was meant to uphold.
28Meaning “Judge Ikuta has hired one Harvard Law Student”, and “Judge Noonan has finished hiring for
this season”.
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in the districts that we analyze. We merge the timing data with data about the number of
clerks a judge has sent to Supreme Court clerkships between 1998 and 2008, our proxy for
the desirability of judges. As in the case for timing data, there is no official data. Instead,
we use the user-compiled dataset on Wikipedia (2013), which lists more than 1900 law clerks
to the Supreme Court, and the clerkship held previously. Details about data collection and
encoding are in Appendix C.
Analysis Figure 2 plots, for each judge, the first and last points in time an entry was
posted about a judge hiring a clerk or completed the hiring process. The dashed vertical
line indicates the hiring plan date. We observe significant unraveling. Hires are spread over
a time period of about half a year, and occur up to five months before the Hiring Plan date.
Strikingly, at almost no point in time between April and December of 2008 was there a lull
in hiring, and the only point in time at which hirings bunch is the Hiring Plan date (as can
be seen by the much steeper increase in the slope in Figure 2 shortly after that date).29
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Figure 2: First and last hiring or finish data points by judge.
Our model links hiring times to the extent of information that is available about students.
The majority of law schools finalized second year grades by the end of June.30 Hence, the
slight increase in activity we observe around June is consistent with our model. Notably,
29Note that the left ends of the bars in figure 2 define an empirical cumulative distribution function.
30Online System for Clerkship Application and Review (2013a).
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judges hiring significantly before this date do so at a loss of information. Information about
students likely continues to arrive even after the release of grades, since many students take
their first position as an intern at a law firm in the summer between second and third year.
Thus, our model accounts for the continued hiring activity in July and August. Overall,
the dispersion of hiring times in this market is consistent with the predictions of our model.
It is reminiscent of the substantial spreading out of offer times that Niederle et al. (2006)
document in the market for gastroenterology fellowships.31
While our data cover one single year, dispersion in hiring times appears to persist past
2008. Tobias (2013) details the various states of hiring that different courts are in for
October 2013, which fall into six categories ranging from “finished hiring” to “have recently
started or not yet begun” and “remain unclear”. A small number of blog postings from the
hiring seasons in 2013 through 2015 are available on a different forum32 and suggest that
hirings are spread over similarly long intervals of time.33
We now turn to the relationship between the time at which judges hire and the desir-
ability of the positions they offer. Figure 3 plots, for each judge, the number of clerks sent
to the Supreme Court between 1998 and 2008 against the point in time at which we first
observe the judge in our data. While the more desirable judges avoid hiring substantially
after the Hiring Plan date, there is no relationship between the number of clerks sent to the
Supreme Court and the hiring time for those judges who hired before or around the Hiring
Plan date.34
Formally, we regress the number of clerks sent to the Supreme Court on the earliest
hiring time from the Clerkship Notification Blog data. Using the entire sample, we find that
a judge who begins hiring 30 days later, ceteris paribus, has sent an average of 0.41 fewer
students to the Supreme Court between 1998 and 2008 (p = 0.075). This number changes
to 0.69 (p = 0.218) once we include only judges who hired at or before the Hiring Plan
date, September 8, and to 0.33 (p = 0.303) once we include observations up to 5 days after
the Hiring Plan date (allowing for delays in reporting). We conclude that there is no clear
31That data was gathered in the aftermath of a disruption of that market, and thus may not reflect
equilibrium behavior.
32www.top-law-schools.com (2015)
33For the 2014 season, www.top-law-schools.com contains reports from January 2013 that judge Kozinski
has finished hiring, and in August 2013 that judge Hamilton has finished hiring. For the 2015 season, two
judges are reported to have finished hiring in August 2013, one judge is reported to be hiring in April 2014,
and others have unclear status in October 2014.
34Our model does not incorporate any effects of ‘soft’ interventions such as the Hiring Plan, and thus
makes no predictions about behavior close to that date.
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Figure 3: Number of clerks sent to the Supreme Court by a judge between 1998 and 2008
versus earliest hire.
relationship between the first time a judge hires a student and the judge’s desirability, as
predicted by our model.35
6 Policy Implications for the Law Clerks Market
Our model suggests that there is no reason to hope that ‘soft’ interventions such as appeals
to wait for a longer time before hiring students may lead to coordination on some ‘better’
equilibrium in the market for law clerks. All equilibria in our model give rise to the same set
of hiring times and the same expected payoffs for employers. Hence, a policy can have lasting
effects only if it changes either payoffs associated with different strategies, or the information
that is available to judges. This may explain why all past attempts at coordinating hiring
to a specified point in time have failed.
6.1 Clearinghouses and Matching Algorithms
Instituting a centralized clearinghouse run at time T is an often discussed proposal that alters
payoffs associated with different strategies. In our model, the unique pairwise stable match
35There are two reasons for a judge’s superior ability to send clerks to the supreme court. First, the judge
may be able to provide more value added to her current clerks than other judges, or have better connections
to the Supreme Court. Second, a judge may have a superior ability to select good students. Judge Wald
(1990) appreciates both channels, Judge Kozinski (1991) emphasizes the former. The data confirm the
predictions of our model to the extent that differences in judges are due to the former channel.
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would result if all employers postponed hiring until the arrival of all pertinent information.
Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the equilibrium outcome in our model is entirely
unaffected by such a change, regardless of the matching mechanism used.36 The reason
is intuitive. If two or more employers participate in a clearinghouse run at time T , it is
necessarily the case that one of these employers faces a positive probability of not matching
with the best available student. This employer can jump the gun and hire the best available
student slightly before the start of the clearinghouse, reaping a discrete gain in expected
student skill level. Hence, at most one employer would ever be willing to participate in such
a clearinghouse.37
Corollary 3. A centralized clearinghouse run at T does not alter the set of equilibrium
outcomes regardless of the matching mechanism employed.
This result is due to the gradual arrival of information rather than due to our assumption
that students are unable to reject offers. To see this, consider our model with the sole change
that students may reject offers, and suppose that the market unravels. In our setting, assor-
tative matching is the unique stable match. Hence, for any other mechanism, there will be a
blocking pair, that is, a student and an employer who would prefer matching to each other
over their respective mechanism-assigned match. Because information arrives continuously,
this pair would be able to find each other with very high probability and sign a contract
at some time slightly before T , thus blocking the match.38 Hence, alternative mechanisms
cannot prevent unraveling. This contrasts with the two-period model in Halaburda (2010)
in which there always exists a (pairwise unstable) mechanism that prevents unraveling.
36Roth and Xing (1994) and Kagel and Roth (2000) argue that whether unraveling occurs in a two-sided
matching market with a centralized clearinghouse depends on whether the mechanism it employs is pairwise
stable. While a stable matching procedure appears necessary to prevent unraveling, it is not sufficient, as the
current paper shows theoretically. Empirically, the Canadian market for lawyers exhibits severe unraveling
even though a centralized clearinghouse is in place (Roth and Xing, 1994). Additionally, Wetz et al. (2010)
study the market for hospital interns in the year 2007, which was cleared using a pairwise stable matching
algorithm, and find that 15.7% of the postgraduate positions were offered outside the match.
37Related to this result, Haruvy et al. (2006) conclude that unraveling in the market for law clerks is not
due to lack of pairwise stability, but due to the ease with which binding contracts are forged.
38Formally, if employer j and the student ranked i at time T are a blocking pair, then the probability that
the student who is ranked i at T − η will still be ranked i at T is arbitrarily close to 1 for sufficiently small
η. Consequently, if employer j and the student who is ranked i at T −η match at T −η, the probability that
one of these agents would prefer to have participated in the matching mechanism at T is arbitrarily small.
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6.2 Changes in the Arrival of Information
In contrast to a centralized clearinghouse, a policy intervention that alters the process by
which information about students is divulged may affect hiring behavior in our model. The
effectiveness of such a policy crucially depends on the details of the implementation.
Continuous Changes in the Arrival of Information. A continuous change in the
arrival of information will only affect the points in time at which hires are made, but not
the equilibrium expected payoff of any market participant.
Formally, we define a change in the arrival of information as follows. Let γ : [0, T ] →
[0, T ] be a strictly increasing function with γ(0) = 0 and γ(T ) = T . Information that arises
at t is made available to employers at γ(t). Hence, if an employer plays e1 at time γ(t), this
employer is assigned the highest ranked available student at t.
Corollary 4. If γ : [0, T ] → [0, T ] is continuous, then in any subgame perfect equilibrium
of our model,
(i) students are hired at times γ(t∗1), . . . , γ(t
∗
J)
(ii) the equilibrium expected utility of each market participant is the same as without the
policy.
This corollary is immediate. Continuity of γ ensures that the conditional expectation
functions are continuous. Therefore we can construct the set of equilibria just as before, by
finding points in time where the expected payoff from exiting the market equals the expected
payoff from staying in the market. Importantly, equilibrium hiring times are defined not by
how much time is left until employment starts, but by the amount of information present
at a given point in time. Since it is the latter that determines employers’ utility in the
game, the policy has no effect on their production. Moreover, both with and without the
policy, all students are identical at time t = 0, and thus face the same distribution over
eventual outcomes. Therefore, students’ ex-ante expected utilities are unaffected by the
policy change.
Information Discontinuities. Employers’ equilibrium payoffs can be affected if the
information revelation policy introduces a discontinuity in the conditional expectation func-
tions. It is crucial that the discontinuity is sufficiently large, as the policy may otherwise
exacerbate unraveling.
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We study the case in which information that arrives in some interval of time [t, t¯), with
t < t¯, is withheld, and discontinuously released at t¯. Formally, γ(t) = t if t ∈ [t, t¯), and
γ(t) = t if t /∈ [t, t¯). Hence, if some employers play actions e ∈ E during the interval [t, t¯),
they are assigned the students they would have been assigned if they all had played the
these actions at time t—except that it is the earlier judges rather than the more desirable
judges who are then allocated the better students. Therefore, any employer who intends
to exit at some time t ∈ (t, t¯) can do at least as well by exiting at t. Thus, this policy is
equivalent to preventing exit in the time interval (t, t¯).
The effect of the policy is best explained in the case of two employers. Plainly, the
policy does not eliminate any equilibria if [t, t¯) does not contain the equilibrium hiring time
t∗1. In all other cases, the location of t and t¯ determines whether the policy alleviates or
exacerbates unraveling.
Consider the graphs in Figure 4, which parallel those of Figure 1. In both panels,
information is released at the same time t¯. If neither employer hires a student before t¯,
then exiting at t¯ is strictly better than remaining in the market. Thus, both employers
will attempt to exit at this time. The more desirable employer 1 will successfully do so,
obtaining a student of expected skill level x1(t¯), while the less desirable employer 2 will
hire the best remaining student at T , expecting a student with skill level x2(T |t¯) < x1(t¯).
Whether employer 2 can do better by exiting before t¯ depends on the start time t of the
withholding period.
In panel (A), the withholding of information starts so early that x1(t) < x2(T |t¯). Hence,
employer 2 prefers hiring the best remaining student at T to exiting the market at any time
at or before t¯. In this case, the policy alleviates unraveling. In panel (B), the withholding
of information starts late, so that x1(t) > x2(T |t¯). In this case, employer 2 prefers exiting
at t to hiring the best of the remaining students at T . Since t < t1, the policy exacerbates
unraveling.
Intuitively, the withholding policy has the potential to exacerbate unraveling because
it places employers in direct competition with each other at time t¯ when information is
released. While more desirable employers benefit from the policy, less desirable employers
lose. Therefore, the policy provides additional incentives for less desirable employers to hire
early.
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Figure 4: The effects of withholding information about students in the case of two em-
ployers. In panel (A), the withholding of information starts early so that the first student
is hired at t¯. In panel (B), the withholding of information starts late. The first student is
hired at t and so the policy exacerbates unraveling.
The following proposition formalizes this discussion for the case of J employers. The con-
dition 0 < xJ(T |T, . . . , T ) in part (i) is necessary, as otherwise the least desirable employer
prefers hiring at 0 to hiring at T even if information is withheld in the interval [0, T ).39
Corollary 5. Suppose that information about students is withheld on the interval [t, t¯) and
discontinuously released at t¯. Then the following holds:
(i) If t is sufficiently low and 0 < xJ(T |T, . . . , T ), then no students are hired before t¯.
Students are hired at the subgame hiring times for history Ht¯ in which no students are
hired during the time interval [0, t¯).
(ii) Withholding information can exacerbate unraveling: there are values t and t¯ with t < t¯
such that the first student is hired strictly before t1.
A policy of withholding information about students successfully curtailed unraveling
in the market for medical residency internships in 1945 (Roth, 1984). The policy was
implemented boldly. Medical colleges agreed to release neither academic transcripts nor
letters of recommendation before an agreed-upon date.40 In other markets, it may be
39This is the case, for instance, if the number of students is smaller than twice the number of judges, i.e.
I < 2J . In this case, the expected skill level of the J-best student at T is negative, and the least desirable
employer would be better off hiring a random student at t = 0.
40The matching that resulted after the release of information was, however, not pairwise stable, which
led to a different set of issues that ultimately led to the adoption of what is known today as the National
Resident Matching Program. See Roth (1984), and Roth and Peranson (1999).
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practically difficult to withhold information for the required amount of time, and to prevent
leakage of information. Indeed, such an attempt faced very limited success in the market
for law clerks (Wald, 1990).
Withholding information about students is not the only means of generating an infor-
mational discontinuity. One alternative consists of limiting the production of information
about students, for instance by switching from letter grades to a pass/fail system.41 Another
possibility is a nationwide test that is designed to provide a sudden surge in information
about students’ abilities. An informational discontinuity is introduced by releasing the test
results at a pre-specified point in time.
Regardless of the specific policy used, a hiring frenzy should be expected when informa-
tion is released. In order to prevent market congestion, it may be necessary to employ a
centralized clearinghouse at that time.42
7 Relation to Models of Early Offers
Most existing work on unraveling in matching markets restricts market participants to trans-
act at one of two points in time. Imposing such a restriction in our model substantially
changes equilibrium outcomes, as it allows employers to avoid competition to a much more
limited extent. Thus, unraveling only partially erodes the advantages of the more desir-
able employers, and hence leads to less redistribution in the restricted model than in the
unrestricted one.
The specific properties of the restricted model depend on the amount of information
that is available in the first period. If there is very little information, it resembles the model
in Halaburda (2010). In this case, pure strategy equilibria exist, and only less desirable
employers hire in the first period. This latter prediction contrasts with both the unrestricted
model and the empirical evidence in Section 5. Intuitively it arises because with very little
information in the first period, every employer obtains a student with expected skill level
close to zero from hiring early. In the second period, more desirable employers manage to
match to the better students. Given this, if there is some employer who finds it profitable
41Yale Law School has used pass/fail grading for first year students in those years in which unraveling was
particularly extreme (Al Roth, personal communication). Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) show how limiting
information about students in a particular fashion may prevent unraveling.
42The more positively assortative the matching algorithm used by the clearinghouse, the smaller the
least desirable employer’s expected payoff from participating in the mechanism, and hence, the larger the
discontinuity needs to be to prevent this employer from hiring early.
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to avoid competition with strong employers in the second period and instead obtain a
student with expected skill level close to zero, then any less desirable employer will find
this profitable, too. By the same argument, we see that expected equilibrium payoffs are
increasing in employer desirability.
If the amount of information available in the first period is sizable, our restricted model
resembles the model in Du and Livne (2013). The game then has a matching-pennies
structure: Less desirable employers prefer to avoid competition with stronger employers,
but stronger employers prefer to directly compete with less desirable ones.43 Hence, any
equilibrium will be in mixed strategies. If the extent of information available in the first
period is sufficiently large, then the expected equilibrium payoffs are increasing in employer
desirability in any mixed strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Let t0 ∈ [0, T ) and suppose that employers can exit the market only at
times t0 and T . Then,
(i) if t0 = 0, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium profile, and every such profile is in
threshold strategies: there is an employer jˆ ∈ {1, . . . , J} such that employers 1, . . . , jˆ
exit at T and all other employers exit at t0. In this case, pi1 > . . . > pijˆ−1 ≥ pijˆ = . . . =
piJ . If, moreover, xJ(T |T, . . . , T ) > 0, then the unique equilibrium is for all employers
to exit in the second period.
(ii) If t0 is sufficiently close to T , then no pure strategy equilibrium exists, and pi1 > . . . >
piJ in any mixed strategy equilibrium.
Two further differences between the restricted and unrestricted versions of our model are
noteworthy. First, if the restricted model features little information in the first period and if
xJ(T |T, . . . , T ) > 0,44 then there will be no unraveling. While less desirable employers would
like to avoid competition with stronger employers, they could do so only at an unprofitably
large informational cost. In contrast, in the unrestricted model, less desirable employers can
always avoid competition by hiring just slightly before stronger employers, at an arbitrarily
small informational cost. Hence, the unrestricted model always features unraveling, and
the vast majority of positions are filled before all pertinent information about students is
available.
43If weaker employers hire in the first period, stronger employers will also prefer hiring in the first period
in order to avoid being preempted, whereas if weaker employers hire in the second period, stronger employers
prefer hiring in the second period in order to reap the informational gains from postponing hiring.
44This is the case if I > 2J .
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Second, while matching mechanisms are of limited usefulness in the unrestricted model
(see Section 6.1), there always exists a (pairwise unstable) second-period matching mech-
anism that completely eliminates unraveling in the restricted model with t0 = 0.
45 The
existence of such a mechanism relies on the fact that employers in the restricted model have
far fewer opportunities to avoid the clearinghouse, and that they can do so only at a large
informational cost.
8 Conclusion
Unraveling is a multifaceted issue that plagues many entry-level labor markets. We comple-
ment the literature by providing a model that focuses on the strategic timing aspect of the
phenomenon. Our model is inspired by the market for law clerks. It thus requires students
to accept any offer they receive, unless they receive multiple simultaneous offers, in which
case they may choose the most preferred one. Employers pick students from the market as
soon as doing so yields the same expected payoff as the continuation strategy. This behavior
thins out the market as it leads to widely dispersed hiring times, and it perfectly equalizes
the student skill level that each employer expects to obtain in equilibrium. This is true even
if all (but the last) hired students receive multiple simultaneous offers. The primitives of our
model – employer desirability and student skill levels – do not tie down the relation between
an employer’s desirability and the point in time at which this employer hires a student. We
expect that this relation is determined by factors orthogonal to our model.
We gathered data on the hiring times of federal appellate judges in 2008, and found them
to be dispersed over a period of six months. Using the number of clerks a judge has been
able to place at the Supreme Court as a proxy for law students’ preferences over judges, we
confirm that there is no statistically significant relationship between the point in time at
which a judge hires clerks, and the judge’s desirability.
Our model shows that the least desirable46 employers strictly prefer any unraveling equi-
librium to an assortative matching that is determined once all pertinent information about
45In our model, randomly matching the J best students at T to employers is such a mechanism. A
more general case is studied in Halaburda (2010). She first considers an equilibrium with unraveling, and
defines a matching mechanism that replicates the outcome of the unraveling equilibrium. This mechanism
is incentive compatible but Pareto-inefficient. She can thus adjust it to make all participants in the market
weakly better off, while retaining incentive compatibility.
46We reiterate that we envisage a market in which all positions offered are more desirable than the outside
option.
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students has arrived. This explains some judges’ opposition towards policy interventions in
this market. Whether unraveling increases or decreases the total production of the market
depends on whether student skill and employer desirability are complements or substitutes.
If a larger number of employers compete for the same set of students, this additional com-
petitive pressure exacerbates unraveling.
Because each equilibrium in our model yields the same equilibrium hiring times and the
same expected utility for each player, our model dampens hopes that ‘soft’ interventions,
such as non-binding attempts to coordinate hiring on a particular point in time, could
alleviate unraveling. More surprisingly, perhaps, instituting a centralized clearinghouse at
the start date of employment will not affect unraveling either, regardless of the assignment
mechanism employed.47 An intervention that can affect equilibrium behavior consists of
creating a discontinuity in the availability of student information to employers. It is crucial
for this to be done boldly; otherwise it may exacerbate unraveling. Implementable policies
include withholding existing student information from prospective employers, limiting the
production of information about students, and instituting a nationwide test that provides a
sudden surge of information about students’ abilities at a single point in time.
Behavior in our model contrasts with behavior in two-period models of early offers which
dominate the literature. While unraveling serves to thin out the market in our model,
competition in two-period models can be avoided partially at best, and hence markets
necessarily remain thick. It is the more desirable employers who benefit from the fact that
the less desirable employers only have limited opportunities to avoid competition. When we
restrict our model to two periods we identify equilibria that differ depending on how much
information is available in the earlier period. If there is little information about students,
only less desirable employers hire early; if there is a large amount of information, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium. While some two-period models find mechanisms that eliminate
unraveling, these mechanisms depend on the fact that the informational loss associated with
hiring early is discrete. Such a policy is less effective in our model, in which information
arrives gradually.
47But given that we study a market in which the unique pairwise stable matching would result if all
employers postponed hiring to a point in time just before the start of employment, this result is perhaps
expected.
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Further research might profitably extend the study of unraveling over time by focusing on
students. Perhaps the most significant contribution could be made by studying unraveling
over time when workers’ wages are up for negotiation.
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APPENDIX
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
0
A Extensions
Our model makes two simplifying assumptions. First, students are not allowed to reject
offers. Second, employers only know the properties of the stochastic process according to
which student skill levels evolve, but do not observe the current realization of the student
skills. Sections A.1 and A.2 relax each of these assumptions in turn. Section A.3 then
shows that our main results regarding the dispersion of hiring times and the order in which
employers exit can also be obtained as the limit of a sequence of discrete time games. For
tractability, we consider the case of two employers.
A.1 Allowing for Student Rejections
Here we show that when students can reject offers, (i) a pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibrium always exists, (ii) unraveling may be more or less severe when students can
reject offers relative to when they cannot, (iii) as students’ utility from the outside option
decreases (while their valuations of employers remain constant), the model with student
rejections converges to the model without student rejections. This last property illustrates
that the model in the main text is one of elite entry level labor markets, in which each
position is preferred to the outside option.
Assumptions All students assign utility u1 to a match with employer 1, u2 to a match
with employer 2, and u0 to being unemployed, with u1 ≥ u2 ≥ u0. Without loss of generality,
we set u1 = 1 and u2 = 0. Students have the same information about the evolution of student
skills as employers. That is, the process according to which student skills evolve is common
knowledge, but students do not possess any information about the current realization of
students’ skills, not even their own. Once a student receives an offer, however, he can
deduce, that he currently is the most highly skilled available student. We use pi(t, t′) to
denote the probability that the student who is ranked first at time t will be ranked i at time
t′ > t. It is clear that pi(t, t′) is continuous for all i, and first-order stochastically increasing
in t for any fixed t′.48
An employer can make an offer to the best available student by playing an action e ∈ E,
as in section 3. Whenever an employer j does so, time is halted, the best available student
learns the identity of the employer making the offer, and must decide immediately whether
48That is, p1(t, t′) and p1(t, t′) + p2(t, t′) are both increasing in t.
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or not to accept this employer’s offer. If he accepts, he and employer j are matched, and
exit the game. Otherwise both players remain in the game. Hence, offers are exploding. We
assume that in case of indifference, students accept an offer. Students do not observe offers
that are made to other students if they are rejected. All other past actions of all agents are
common knowledge.
Note that accepting an offer from employer 1 is a weakly dominant strategy for any
student, and so is accepting the best offer received at time T . Hence, we can represent a
student’s strategy as a mapping H → {a, r} where a and r are the actions of accepting
and rejecting an offer by employer 2, respectively. Additionally, an employer’s strategy of
making an offer to the currently second best available student at any time t < T is strictly
dominated by the strategy of hiring the best available student at T . Therefore, we lose no
generality by assuming that employer’s actions at each point in time t are whether or not
to make an offer to the currently best available student. For tractability we only consider
equilibria that are symmetric in the sense that all students play the same strategy. For
notational convenience, instead of writing “the currently best available student”, we simply
write “the student”.
Analysis Suppose that the student knows that the next point in time at which employer
1 will make an offer to the then best available student is t. We can then derive the last point
in time τ(t) at which the student would accept an offer from employer 2. From accepting
employer 2’s offer, a student receives utility u2. Comparing this to the expected utility from
rejecting the offer, we obtain that
τ(t) = max{t′ : p1(t′, t)u1 + p2(t′, t)u2 + (1− p1(t′, t)− p2(t′, t))u0 ≤ u2}
We characterize the equilibria of this game depending on the value of τ(T ). As in the case
without student rejections, we define t1 by x1(t1) = x2(T |t1). Additionally, we define t¯
by x1(t¯) = x2(T |T ) (see figure 5). We distinguish between three cases, depending on the
location of τ(T ) relative to t1 and t¯.
Case 1 The case τ(t) < t¯ obtains if u0 is high, so that students have a strong preference
for employer 1 over employer 2 relative to their fear of unemployment. Hiring before t¯ is
not attractive for either employer: postponing hiring until T yields a higher expected payoff
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even for the employer who will match to the second best student at T . Employer 2’s offer to
the best student will be rejected if made at any time t ∈ (τ(T ), T ). Hence employer 1 faces
no competition in this time interval, and thus has no reason to make an offer. Thus, the
student’s assumption that no offer will be made in the interval (τ(T ), T ) is correct. Hence,
there is an equilibrium without unraveling in which employers will assortatively match to
students at T .
Case 2 Next, we consider the case t¯ ≤ τ(T ) ≤ t1, which obtains if u0 is in an intermediate
range such that students have somewhat weaker preferences for employer 1 over employer 2
relative to their fear of unemployment. Employer 2 prefers to make an offer to a student as
late as possible. But he also strives to avoid competition by employer 1. Hence, employer
2 will find it optimal to make an offer to the best student at τ(T ), and this student will
accept. Employer 1 faces no competition in the time interval (τ(T ), T ), and hence will not
make any offer during this interval. Moreover, making an offer at or before τ(T ) is a weakly
dominated strategy for employer 1. This justifies the student’s assumption that no offer
will be made in the interval (τ(T ), T ). Notably, in this equilibrium, the students’ ability to
reject offers exacerbates unraveling relative to the case without student rejections.
Case 3 Finally, we study the case t1 < τ(T ), which is most similar to the case without
student rejections. A pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium always exists, since giving
the students the opportunity to reject offers essentially renders the model into a discrete time
game, through the following argument. By assumption, at time τ(T ), the last point in time
at which the student would accept employer 2’s offer, exiting beats staying in the game for
both employers. Thus employer 1 will make an offer to the student at τ(T ). Consequently,
the student will not accept an offer from employer 2 sufficiently shortly before τ(T ), since
he knows that he will receive an offer from employer 1 at time τ(T ). There will, however, be
a latest time before τ(T ), denoted τ2(T ), at which the student would accept employer 2’s
offer. If that point in time is is again strictly later than t∗1, exiting at τ
2(T ) beats waiting
for both employers, and hence, employer 1 will make an offer to the student at that point
in time, and we can iterate the previous argument. Thus, the students’ strategy essentially
renders the game into a discrete time game between employers, since employer 2 can only
possibly exit at times τn(T ). In equilibrium, the first exit occurs at one of the two grid
points that are closest to t1. Which one it is depends on whether exiting at the grid point
3
just before t∗1 is better or worse for employer 2 than being preempted by employer 1 at the
first grid point after t∗1. As always, the second exit occurs at T . Moreover, the discrete
time grid that emerges becomes increasingly fine as the utility u0 from the outside option
decreases, since the student becomes increasingly unwilling to wait for a any given amount
of time in hope for an offer from employer 1. Hence, as u0 approaches −∞, the time of first
exit approaches t1. The order of exit in the limit is indeterminate in the following sense: For
each u ∈ R a value u′0 < u can be found such that employer 1 is first to exit, and another
value u′′0 < u can be found such that employer 2 is first to exit.
To formally describe the equilibrium in this case, we set τ0(T ) = T . Inductively, we then
define τn(T ) = τ(τn−1(T )) as the last point in time strictly before τ(τn−1(T )) at which the
student is willing to accept employer 2’s offer if he knows that he will receive an offer from
employer 1 at time τn−1(T ) if he is still the best available student at that time. We call the
points in time {τn(T )|n ∈ N} threat times. Define τ∗+ = min{τn(T ) : τn(T ) ≥ t1, n ∈ N},
and τ∗− = τ(τ
∗
+)
We define the players’ strategies as follows:
• The student accepts an offer from employer 2 at all threat times τn(T ) ≥ τ∗−, and
rejects it otherwise.
• Employer 1 plays e1 at each threat time τn(T ) ≥ τ∗+, and plays s otherwise.
• Employer 2 plays e1 at each threat time τn(T ) ≥ τ∗+, additionally plays e1 at threat
time τ∗− if x1(τ
∗
−) ≥ x2(T |τ∗+), and plays s otherwise.
We show that this pure strategy profile is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our
argument relies on the fact that for any t > 0 the interval [t, T ] contains a finite number of
threat times. To see this, suppose that t˜ > 0 is an accumulation point of threat times. This
means that for each  > 0 we have
p1(t˜, t˜+ )u1 + p
2(t˜, tˆ+ )u2 +
(
1− p1(t˜, t˜+ )− p2(t˜, t˜+ ))u0 > u2
Note that p1(t˜, t˜) = 1. Therefore, the left hand side of the above expression equals u1
when  = 0, which strictly exceeds u2. This contradicts the fact that (p1(t
′, t), p2(t′, t)) is
continuous in (t′, t).
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We now show that no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. Clearly, making
an offer at any time t ∈ (τ1(T ), T ) is suboptimal for employer 1, since at any such point in
time an offer by employer 2 would be rejected, so that this employer is no serious competitor
at such a time. If τ1(T ) > t1, then employer 2 will make an offer at that time. Because
in this case, x1(τ
1(T )) > x2(T |τ1(T )), employer 1 will also make an offer at that time.
Therefore, for any point in time t ∈ (τ2(t), τ1(T )), rejecting employer 2’s offer is rational
for the student, and hence employer 1 will not make an offer at any such point in time. But
since the student will accept employer 2’s offer if he receives it at time τ2(T ), as long as
x1(τ
2(T )) > x2(T |τ2(T )), employer 1 will also make an offer at that point in time. When
the first offer will be made, an by whom it will be made now depends on the exact location
of τ∗+ and τ
∗
−. By definition of τ
∗
+, if both employers are still in the game at that point in
time, both employers will play e1, employer 1 will exit, and employer 2 will earn expected
payoff x2(T |τ∗+). Instead, by preempting employer 1 and playing e1 at τ∗−, he can instead
obtain expected payoff x1(τ
∗
−).
In conclusion, depending on the precise value of u0, one of the following two outcomes
is consistent with a subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium profile:
• Employer 2 plays e1 at τ∗−, the student accepts, and employer 1 exits at T .
• Both employer 1 and employer 2 play e1 at τ∗+, the student employer 1’s offer, and
employer 2 exits at T .
Finally, it is clear that as u0 approaches −∞, the distance between any two threat times
approaches 0. In particular, |τ∗− − t1| and |τ∗+ − t1| approach 0. In this sense, the model
with student rejections converges to the model without student rejections.
A.2 Fully Observable Student Skill Levels
Our model is tractable because employers cannot condition their strategies on the current
realization of students’ skills – they possess no information that would enable them to do
so. In this section we relax this assumption. Employers have full knowledge of the current
realization of all students’ skill levels at each point in time. We formally derive a subgame
perfect equilibrium in the case of two employers. We find that hirings are still dispersed
in time, and any employer faces the same ex ante expected payoff from hiring at any of
these points in time in equilibrium. By arguments that parallel those in sections 6.2 and
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Figure 5: The model with two employers when students can reject offers. The first exit
never occurs before t, but may occur between t and t∗1.
6.1, continuous changes in the speed of arrival of information have no effect on equilibrium
payoffs, and the mechanism that is employed by a centralized clearinghouse has no effect on
equilibrium behavior.
Setup Both employers can, at any time, make an offer to any student i of their choosing
by playing action ei, or they can choose to play action s and remain in the game. Students
must accept any offer they receive, except in the case that they receive multiple offers. In
this case, the more attractive employer 1 is assigned the student. For simplicity, we assume
that an employer’s payoff from failing to hire a student is −∞.
Analysis Let x1(t, q) denote the skill level that an employer can expect at t if he hires
the best student at t, given that the vector of student skill level at that time is q. By the
martingale property of the Brownian motion it is immediate that
x1(t, q) = max
i
qi
Once a student has been hired, the best response of the remaining employer is to wait until
T and hire the best available student then. Let t be the point in time at which the first
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student was hired. Let
x2(t, q) = Et
[
max
{
qi(T ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ I, i 6= argmaxiqi(t)
}]
Here, the function argmax returns the lowest-index maximizer of its argument. x2(t, q) is
the expected value of this strategy conditional on the information available at t. It depends
on the vector of skill levels q that prevailed at t, and on the distance between t and the start
date of employment, T .
As in our baseline model, we would like to define a point in time at which exiting the
game yields the same expected payoff as remaining in the game. This will now depend on
the realizations of the student skill levels. Specifically, we define A ⊂ [0, T ] × RI as the
set of pairs (t, q) such that the expected value from hiring the best student is equal to the
expected value from the continuation strategy x2(t, q),
A =
{
(t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× RI : x1(t, q)− x2(t, q) ≥ 0)
}
The set A characterizes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.49
Proposition 4. Define employers’ strategies σ1 and σ2 as follows. If no student has yet
been hired and (t, q) ∈ A, or if a student has been hired and t = T , then σj(t, q) = eargmaxiqi .
Otherwise, σj(t, q) = s. Then, σ = (σ1, σ2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose employer −j plays strategy σ−j . It is immediate that σj is a best response
to σ−j if and only if σj prescribes waiting with hiring until T if employer −j has already
exited. Moreover, by the definition of A, employer j strictly prefers playing s to playing e1
at any (t, q) /∈ A, and weakly prefers playing e1 at any (t, q) ∈ A. Consequently, σj is a best
response to σ−j .
Observe that each employer’s ex ante expected in this equilibrium is the same, and that
the points in time at which students are hired are dispersed in time, with the last student
being hired at T . This parallels parts (i) and (ii) of corollary 1 in the main text. Moreover,
it is apparent that continuous changes in the speed of arrival of information have no effect
49Observe that the boundary of A is a one-dimensional smooth submanifold of [0, T ]×RI . By setting x3
as the conditional expectation of the maximal student skill at the point in time at which the process hits
A, we could, in principle, generalize this analysis to 3 employers, and use induction to extend the analysis
to n employers. Doing so requires one to prove a theorem about the smoothness of hitting distributions of
I-dimensional Brownian motions on submanifolds of [0, T ]× RI .
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on equilibrium payoffs. It is also apparent that at most one student will be hired at any
given point in time, so that the mechanism that is employed by a centralized clearinghouse
will have no effect on equilibrium behavior.
A.3 Discrete Time Limits
Here we show that our main results – the dispersion of hiring times, and the indeterminate
order in which employers exit the market – are not an artifact of the continuous time
formulation we adopt. To do so, we derive the same results as the limit of discrete time
games.
Let (Tn)n be a sequence of partitions of [0, T ] into intervals [τ
n
k , τ
n
k+1) and the element
{T}, such that ln, defined as the length of the widest interval in element Tn, converges to
0 as n approaches infinity. For each n define τ˜n+ = min{τnk : τnk ≥ t1} and τ˜n− = max{τnk :
τnk < t1}.
We derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for each n. If one employer has exited
previously, the remaining employer finds it optimal to stay in the game until T . Hence,
we can summarize each employer’s strategy by noting the first point in time at which this
employer exits if both employers are still in the game. If the more desirable employer 1
would exit at tnk , then, as long as x1(t
n
k−1) > x2(T |tnk ), the less desirable employer 2 finds it
optimal to preempt employer 1 by exiting at tnk−1. Similarly, if the less desirable employer 2
finds it optimal to exit at tnk−1, then, as long as x1(t
n
k−1) > x2(T |tnk−1), the more desirable
employer 1 finds it optimal to preempt employer 2 by exiting at tnk−1 too. For all n with
τ˜n+ > t1, backwards induction thus implies that in equilibrium either (i) employer 2 exits at
τ˜n− with employer 1 exiting at T , or (ii) that employer 1 exits at τ˜
n
+ with employer 2 exiting
at T . Case (i) applies if x1(τ˜
n
−) > x2(T |τ˜n+). This, in turn, holds if t1 is located at the lower
end in the interval [τ˜n−, τ˜
n
+). Case (ii) applies if the opposite inequality holds, which holds
if t1 is located at the upper end in the interval [τ˜
n
−, τ˜
n
+). (If τ˜
n
+ = t1, then there are two
equilibria; one employer exits at t1, and the other exits at T .)
Clearly, both τ˜n− and τ˜
n
+ converge to t1, and in each subgame equilibrium one employer
exits at T . This shows that in the limit of the discrete time games the hiring times are given
as in the continuous formulation. Additionally, continuity of the functions x1(·) and x2(T |·)
allows us to choose the sequence (Tn)n both such that x1(τ˜
n
−) > x2(T |τ˜n+) holds for each n,
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or that the opposite inequality holds for each n. Thus, both orders of employers exiting the
market can be sustained as a limit of discrete time games.
Finally, note that the difference in the expected productivity of the students that em-
ployers 1 and 2 are matched to approaches zero from below, and does so monotonically if
the sequence of partitions (Tn)n is nested. Hence, the more frequent the opportunities for
employers to hire students, the smaller the difference in expected worker productivity across
employers.
B Numerical Simulation of the Model
To assess the extent of unraveling that our model predicts, and the welfare loss associated
with unraveling, we simulate our model numerically. We set T = 1 and interpret the
equilibrium hiring times as the fraction of time to the start of employment T that has
passed.
For welfare analysis we interpret our results in terms of information used or lost in
the following sense. We assume that employer desirability and student skills are neither
substitutes nor complements: αj = 1 for all j. The distribution of a randomly selected
student’s skill level at T = 1 is standard normal, and hence has standard deviation of 1.
Hence, if employer j obtains payoff pi, this means that the skill level of the student to which
he is assigned, on average, exceeds the expected skill level of a randomly selected student
by pi standard deviations.
We calculate the conditional expectation functions xj using Monte Carlo simulations
with 50,000 independent realizations of the stochastic processes.50 We simulate our model
with 2, 3 or 4 employers and with 10, 20 or 50 students.51
Figure 6 presents the vector of equilibrium hiring times for each market. The extent
of unraveling is substantial. In each of the markets considered, the first student is hired
before 80% of the time has passed, and when the ratio of students to employers is low, the
first student is hired before 30% of the time has passed. The dispersion of hiring times is
50We calculate the equilibrium hiring times on a uniform grid with 50 elements.
51The computational burden increases exponentially with the number of employers, since each employer
increases the dimensionality of the problem. Hence, we consider markets with a small number of employers.
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Number of employers
Number of students 2 3 4
10 s s s s s s s s s
20 s s s s s s s s s
50 s s s s s s s s s
Figure 6: Equilibrium hiring times. Each horizontal bar represents the time interval [0, T ].
Black dots represent equilibrium hiring times.
substantial and hiring times do not bunch. Moreover, the first hiring time decreases with
the number of employers and increases with the number of students.52
It would seem that such early hiring times are associated with substantial welfare losses.
Our simulations, however, suggest otherwise. Figure 7 reports, for each market, the expected
production achieved by the average employer. Because αj = 1 for all j, this equals the
expected student skill level obtained. This is contrasted to the employer’s expected payoff
from an assortative matching of the J best students to employers at T . To interpret the
numbers, note that 0 is the expected student skill level that the average employer would
obtain from a random assignment of students to employers. Relative to this benchmark, the
production attained in equilibrium exceeds 87% of the production that could be obtained
by an assortative matching at T (the maximal possible production) in each of the markets
analyzed. Moreover, the percentage of maximal production attained decreases with the
intensity of competition: it decreases with the number of employers for a given number of
students, and it increases with the number of students for a given number of employers.53
The unraveling equilibrium is associated with substantial redistribution. In the case of 4
employers and 10 students, from an assortative matching at T the most desirable employer
expects almost double the student skill level he expects in equilibrium. In contrast, the least
desirable employer expects just about half the expected student skill level in an assortative
matching relative to equilibrium. Moreover, the smaller the number of students relative to
the number of employers, the larger is the extent of redistribution.
52We also observe that the first hiring time is not simply a function of the ratio of employers to students:
with 2 employers and 10 students, the first hiring time is 0.61 whereas with 4 employers and 20 students it
is 0.43.
53We can also infer the reason for the latter effect from our model: the absolute loss in mean productivity
due to unraveling varies very little with the number of students, but the mean production that can be
achieved from a matching at T increases substantially in the number of students.
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Number of Employers
Number of Students 2 3 4
10 M = 1.27, E = 1.19
1.00 1.54
M = 1.06, E = 0.97
0.66 1.00 1.54
M = 0.89, E = 0.78
0.37 0.65 1.00 1.54
20 M = 1.57, E = 1.54
1.41 1.86
M = 1.47, E = 1.38
1.13 1.41 1.87
M = 1.33, E = 1.23
0.92 1.13 1.41 1.86
50 M = 2.05, E = 1.99
1.85 2.25
M = 1.91, E = 1.84
1.63 1.86 2.25
M = 1.80, E = 1.71
1.46 1.63 1.86 2.25
1
Figure 7: Employer payoffs. The thick vertical line depicts the payoff in the unraveling
equilibrium. The dashed line depicts the average payoff form an assortative matching at T .
The bars depict the payoff of each employer from an assortative matching at T depending
on his desirability.
C Data Sourcing and Encoding
Data sourcing. While we only use data for positions starting in 2009, the Clerkship No-
tification Blog also features partial data about positions starting in 2010. The data for 2010,
however, contain a considerably smaller number of entries, likely due to competing blogs.
Unfortunately, data from the blog that ultimately succeeded the Clerkship Notification Blog
(“Law Clerk Addict”) is no longer available.
We considered an additional data source, and a further proxy for the desirability of the
judges. First, the internet blog “Top Law Schools” (Anonymous, 2013) provides a partial
account of the number of clerks sent to the Supreme Court by individual circuit judges
between 2009 and 2013. As an alternative proxy we considered the number of times a judge
was mentioned in the Clerkship Notification Blog. We expect this to be correlated with
judges’ desirability if clerkships with more highly desirable judges are discussed more often.
Given that other factors, such as the predictability of a judge’s behavior, may also affect
how often a judge’s name is mentioned, we expect this proxy to be noisy. As with our main
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proxy, for neither of these alternative measures of desirability do we find a relationship with
judges’ hiring times.
Data encoding. We code the timing data as follows. For each of the twelve regional
federal court of appeals circuits54 we made note of the exact time and date of every blog
entry that included information on hiring and interviewing. We categorized these entries
in two dimensions. First, we noted whether claims were being made about (i) students
still in law school, (ii) individuals who had previously graduated from law school, or (iii)
whether it was unclear. Second, we classified entries as claims that a judge (a) was reviewing
applications, (b) was making telephone calls or sending emails to schedule interview times,
(c) was interviewing, (d) had made a hire, or (e) had finished the hiring process. We
adhered to the following four rules while categorizing our data. 1. Unless blog entries were
subsequently claimed to be false or corrected, we assumed every blog entry that was phrased
as a statement rather than a question to be evidence that a hiring event occurred. 2. Clear
confirmations of events were treated as repeated data points and were not included in our
analysis. (For example, while we recorded the entry “Bea called to set up interviews” on
September 8, 2008 at 8:48 pm, we did not record the subsequent entry “I can confirm that
Bea definitely set up at least two interviews today.” on September 8, 2008 at 11:35 pm.
Whereas, both of the following entries were treated as unique data points: “Gorsuch has
hired two for the current term...” on July 7, 2008 at 8:24 am and “Gorsuch has hired a ...
clerk from Harvard.” on July 17, 2008 at 3:46 pm.) 3. We did not include very late entries
which occurred considerably after the majority of activity had ceased since this was most
likely relevant to the 2010-2011 season. 4. We recorded the date of each hire, interview,
review, etc. as the time at which the event was recorded on the blog. We did not take into
account any comments about when the event occurred (such as “Interviewed with Briscoe
last week...”). One exception to this rule is that there were a number of entries that explicitly
stated that calls were made at, or a few minutes after, 12:00 pm on September 8th. These
blog entries were mostly all posted within a few hours of 12:00 pm and were recorded as
12:00 pm rather than the precise time at which they were posted.
54The number of blog entries for the federal circuit court of appeals is very limited, most likely because
many federal circuit judges do not hire current law students. For this reason, we exclude these entries from
our analysis.
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Some data points may concern the hiring of students who have already graduated, and to
whom the Hiring Plan does not apply. For the vast majority of the blog entries in our data
it was not possible to determine whether they were referring to a current or graduated law
student. The fact that the hiring plan was officially abandoned in November 2013 because
fewer and fewer judges adhered to it makes us confident that a significant number of our
data points refer to current law students rather than graduates.
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D Mathematical Appendix
D.1 Definition of mixed stratgies
A (mixed) strategy of an employer j is a function σj : H → E ∪ {s} that maps a history
Ht into a cumulative probability distribution F
j(·;Ht) ∈ [0, 1]I with support contained in
[t, T ]. The ith component of F j(t′;Ht) is the probability that employer j plays one of the
actions e1, . . . , ei in the interval [t, t
′] if no other employers have taken any action e ∈ E in
the interval [t, t′). Because F j is a cumulative distribution function, it is right-continuous.55
This implies that for any pure strategy an employer might have, in any subgame there is a
well-defined first point in time at which an employer takes an action e ∈ E.56
We require each strategy σj to be internally consistent in the following sense: fix a
history Ht, and define, for all t˜ ≥ t, the history H˜t˜ as the history which coincides with Ht
up to and including time t, and in which every employer plays action s at each point in time
[t, t˜]. Then for any t′ ∈ [t˜, T ], the probability that σj(H˜t˜) assigns to an action e ∈ E in time
interval [t˜, t′] coincides with the probability that σj(Ht) assigns to the same action e in the
same time interval [t˜, t′].
D.2 Proof of proposition 1
We start by defining the notation. Let (Ω,F, (Ft)t, P ) be a filtered probability space. Let
q be an I-dimensional Brownian motion defined on this space with q(0) = 0. For path
ω ∈ Ω and time t ∈ [0, T ], we write qω(t) = (qω1 (t), . . . , qωI (t)), and use W to denote the
Wiener measure. N(µ, σ2) denotes the unidimensional normal distribution with mean µ and
variance σ2. The symbol % denotes first order stochastic dominance, and ' denotes equality
in distribution. In the Euclidian space Rn, ≥ denotes the product order57 and B(x) denotes
the -ball with radius  and center x. For x ∈ RI , we let argmax(x) denote the minimal
i such that xi ≥ xi′ for all i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , I}. We denote the set of available students after
previous students have been picked at times τ1, . . . , τk by ak+1(τ1, . . . , τk).
55A function f : R → R is right continuous at x ∈ R if for all sequences (xn)n∈N with xn > x for all
n ∈ N, limxn→x f(xn) = f(x).
56For instance, a plan of action in which an employer plays s for all t ≤ tˆ for some tˆ, and plays e1 for all
t > tˆ, is not an admissible strategy.
57I.e. for x, y ∈ Rn we have x ≥ y ⇔ xi ≥ yi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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We recursively define ak+1(τ1, . . . , τk) by setting a1 = {1, . . . , I}, and
ak+1(τ1, . . . , τk) = ak(τ1, . . . , τk−1) \ argmaxi∈ak(τ1,...,τk−1)qi(τk)
Additionally, we define
i∗(t, ak+1(τ1, . . . , τk)) = argmaxi∈ak(τ1,...,τk)qi(t).
Note that both a and i∗ are stochastic processes.
The proposition to be proven here concerns properties of the conditional expectation
functions. The conditional expectation function xk+1(t|τ1, . . . , τk) is given by
xk+1(t|τ1, . . . , τk) = E
[
qi∗(t,ak+1(τ))(T )
]
= E
[
E
[
qi∗(t,ak+1(τ))(T )|Ft
]]
= E
[
E
[
max
i∈ak+1(τ)
{qi(t)}
∣∣∣Ft]]
= E
[
max
i∈ak+1(τ)
{qi(t)}
]
The second and fourth line follow by the law of iterated expectations, the third by the
martingale property of the Brownian motion. We now show that the conditional expectation
functions satisfy the five properties in proposition 1.
(i) To show that xk+1(t|τ1, . . . , τk) is jointly continuous in all arguments, choose t ∈ [0, T ]
and τ ∈ [0, T ]k, with t ≥ τk ≥ . . . ≥ τ1. Fix a sequence (tl, τ l)l that converges to (t, τ),
such that tl ≥ τ lk ≥ . . . ≥ τ l1 for all l. We need to show that liml→∞ |xk+1(tl|τ l) −
xk+1(t|τ)| = 0.
We define
Xl = max
i∈a(τ l)
qi(t
l)− max
i∈a(τ)
qi(t)
Note that
∣∣xk+1(tl|τ l1, . . . , τ lk)− xk+1(t|τ1, . . . , τk)∣∣ = |E(Xl)|. By Jensen’s inequality,
we have |E(Xl)| ≤ E(|Xl|). It thus suffices to show that Xl → 0 in the L1-norm.
We proceed in two steps. Lemma 2 shows that Xl converges to 0 almost everywhere.
Lemma 3 shows that the sequence Xl is uniformly integrable. A direct application of
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the Lebesgue-Vitali theorem (theorem 4.5.4 in Bogachev (2007)58) then yields Xl → 0
in L1.
Lemma 2. P (liml→∞Xl = 0) = 1
Proof. Let Ω′ = {ω ∈ Ω : q(ω) is continuous }. It is a standard result in the theory
of Brownian motions that P (Ω′) = 1. Let Ω′′ = {ω ∈ Ω : qi(t′) 6= qi′(t′) ∀t′ ∈
{τ1, . . . , τk, t} ∀i 6= i′}. Because the Brownian motion has Gaussian increments,
P (Ω′′) = 1, and hence P (Ω′ ∩ Ω′′) = 1.
Let ω ∈ Ω′ ∩ Ω′′. Because the path qω(t′) is continuous in t′, we get that for all
t′ ∈ {τ1, . . . , τk, t} there exists (t′) > 0 such that for all t′′ ∈ B(t′)(t′) we have
argmaxi′∈ak(τ)q
ω
i′(t
′) = argmaxi′∈ak(τ)q
ω
i′(t
′′).
Because (τ l, t) → (τ, t), we get that for all sufficiently large l, ak(τ) = ak(τ l) and
argmaxi∈ak(τ)qi(t) = argmaxi∈ak(τ)qi(t
l). Then it follows by continuity of qω that
qi∗(t,a(τ))(t) = liml qi∗(t,a(τ l))(t
l) as was to be shown.
Lemma 3. The sequence (Xl)l is uniformly integrable.
Proof. For each l, let (Y li )i∈1,...,I denote a sequence of vectors of N(0, |t− tl|) random
variables, and let (Zli)i∈1,...,I denote a sequence of vectors of N(0,min{t, tl}) random
variables such that for each l, and for all i 6= i′, Y li and Zli are independent.
Let u¯l = maxi∈I |qi(tl)|, and ul = maxi∈a(τ l) qi(tl). Likewise, let v¯l = maxi∈I |qi(t)|,
and vl = maxi∈a(τ) qi(t). Trivially, u¯l ≥ ul, and v¯l ≥ vl.
We can bound |X l| as follows.
|Xl| = |ul − vl|
≤ |ul|+ |vl|
≤ u¯l + v¯l
= max
i∈1,...,I
|Zli + Y li |+ max
i∈1,...,I
|Zli |
≤ max
i∈1,...,I
|Y li |+ 2 max
i∈1,...,I
|Zli | (1)
58Bogachev, V. I. (2007) Measure Theory, Springer, Berlin.
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The second and the last line follow by the triangle inequality, the fourth line is due
to Jensen’s inequality, and the penultimate line follows by the independent Gaussian
increments property of the Brownian motion. By the above, it suffices to show that
the sequence
(
maxi∈1,...,I |Y li |+ 2 maxi∈1,...,I |Zli |
)
l
is uniformly integrable.
It is a standard result in probability theory that if Z is a N(0, σ2) variable, then
E(Z|Z ≥ c) = σ φ(c)1−Φ(c) , where φ and Φ denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard
normal distribution, respectively. Thus, E(|Z|1{|Z|≥c}) = 2E(Z|Z ≥ c)P (Z ≥ c) =
2σφ(c).
Note that
E
((
max
i∈1,...I
|Y li |
)
1{maxi∈1,...I |Y li |≥c}
)
≤
∑
i∈1,...I
E
(
|Y li |1{|Y li |≥c}
)
= 2I|t− tl|φ(c)
Similarly, E
((
maxi∈1,...,I |Zli |
)
1{maxi∈1,...,I |Zli |≥c}
)
≤ 2I|max{t, tl}|φ(c)
Combining these results with (1), we can derive the following bound
∫ ∞
c
|Xl|dW ≤ 2
∫ ∞
c
max
i∈1,...I
|Y li |dFY + 4
∫ ∞
c
max
i∈1,...I
|Zli |dFZ
≤ (2I|t− tl|+ 4I max{t, tl})φ(c)
where FY and Fz denote the distributions of the random vectors Y and Z, respectively.
Because tl → t, both sequences (|t− tl|)
l
and
(
max{t, tl})
l
are bounded above , and
hence, the sequence
(
2I|t− tl|+ 4I max{t, tl})
l
is bounded above by some C ∈ R.
Therefore,
lim
c→∞ supl
∫ ∞
c
|Xl|dW ≤ lim
c→∞Cφ(c) = 0
as was to be shown.
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(ii) To show that xk+1(t|τ1, . . . , τk) is strictly increasing in t, fix τ ∈ [0, T ]k with τk ≥
. . . ≥ τ1, and let t′ > t ≥ τk. By the law of iterated expectations,
xk+1(t
′|τ) = P (i∗(t′, a(τ)) = i∗(t, a(τ))) ·
E [max{qi(t′) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) = i∗(t, a(τ))]
+P (i∗(t′, a(τ)) 6= i∗(t, a(τ))) ·
E [max{qi(t′) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) 6= i∗(t, a(τ))]
Now, E
[
max{qi(t′) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) = i∗(t, a(τ))
]
=
E [max{qi(t) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) = i∗(t, a(τ))] by the martingale property and the
conditioning. Moreover, E
[
max{qi(t′) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ))
6= i∗(t, a(τ))] > E [max{qi(t) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) 6= i∗(t, a(τ))] by the definition of
i∗. Finally, P (i∗(t′, a(τ)) 6= i∗(t, a(τ))) > 0 because the Brownian motion has Gaus-
sian increments and thus, q(t′)|q(t) has full support on RI . Therefore,
xk+1(t
′|τ) > P (i∗(t′, a(τ)) = i∗(t, a(τ))) ·
E [max{qi(t) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) = i∗(t, a(τ))]
+P (i∗(t′, a(τ)) 6= i∗(t, a(τ))) ·
E [max{qi(t) : i ∈ a(τ)}|i∗(t′, a(τ)) 6= i∗(t, a(τ))]
= xk+1(t|τ)
as was to be shown.
(iii) We prove two lemmas that imply the claim. For each d ∈ {1, . . . , I}, we define the fol-
lowing three mappings. ϕd : Rd → Rd−1 is given by ϕd(x) = (x1, . . . , xi∗(x)−1, xi∗(x)+1, . . . , xd).
Hence, ϕd(x) equals x with the highest element removed. For any 1 ≤ k ≤ d, we define
pikd : R
d → Rd−1 by pikd(x) = (x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xd). Finally, ψd : Rd → Rd is the
mapping that orders a vector by size, largest dimension first (lowest index first in case
of ties). Plainly, for any random vector X, the order statistics of X and ψd(X) are
identical.
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Intuitively, the following lemma shows that when employer j′ picks before some time
t′, the pool of remaining students at t′ is better (in the f.o.s.d. sense) than if he picks
at t′.
Lemma 4. Let X and Y be independent Rd-valued random variables. Let M =
argmax1≤i≤dXi. Then,
ψd
[
ϕd(X) + pi
M
d (Y )
]
% ψd [ϕd(X + Y )] (2)
Proof. Let U = X + Y . Let R denote the ranking of UM . I.e. R = 1 if UM is the
highest element of U , R = 2 if UM is the second highest element of U , and so on. Then,
letting LH and RH denote the left and right hand sides of equation (2), respectively,
we get
LH =
[(
ψd(U)
)
1
, . . . ,
(
ψd(U)
)
R−1,
(
ψd(U)
)
R+1
, . . . ,
(
ψd(U)
)
d
]
RH =
[(
ψd(U)
)
2
, . . . ,
(
ψd(U)
)
R
,
(
ψd(U)
)
R+1
, . . . ,
(
ψd(U)
)
d
]
Hence, LHi ≥ RHi for all i ≤ R − 1, and LHi = RHi for all i ≥ R. Consequently,
P (LH ≥ RH) = 1 so that the claim is a direct application of Strassen’s theorem
(theorem 2.4 in chapter IV, Lindvall (2002)).
Intuitively, the following lemma shows that if the best student i is picked from a pool
of students, then the better this pool was before the best student was picked (in the
f.o.s.d. sense), the better the pool of the remaining students (in the f.o.s.d. sense).
Lemma 5. Let X, X ′, and Y be Rd-valued random variables, such that
(a) X % X ′
(b) X and X ′ are both independent of Y .
Then, ϕd(X + Y ) % ϕd(X ′ + Y ).
Proof. By Strassen’s theorem, the stochastic dominance relation X % X ′ is equivalent
to the existence of a coupling Pˆ such that Pˆ (X ≥ X ′) = 1.59 Define the random vari-
59A coupling of two probability measures P and P ′ on the same measurable space (E,E) is any probability
measure Pˆ on the product measurable space (E × E,E⊗ E) (where E⊗ E is the smallest σ-field containing
E× E) whose marginals are P and P ′.
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able (Y1, Y2) on Rd×Rd such Y1 ' Y , Y2 ' Y , and Pˆ (Y1 = Y2) = 1. Then, Pˆ (X+Y ≥
X ′+Y ) = 1, and by monotonicity of ϕd we obtain Pˆ (ϕd(X + Y ) ≥ ϕd(X ′ + Y )) = 1.
By Strassen’s theorem this is equivalent to the claim.
We now combine lemmas 4 and 5 to show that xk+1(t|t1, . . . , tk) is decreasing in tj
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Fix t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tk, and fix some 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Then, if j > 1, let
t′j ∈ (tj−1, tj). If instead j = 1, let t′j ∈ [0, tj). (For t′j < tj−1, the claim follows by
repeated application of the current argument.)
For any subset a ⊆ {1, . . . , I}, let ρa : RI → R|a| be given by ρa(x) = (xi)i∈a. Let
X be a random variable on RI−j with X ' ρa(t1,...,tj)(q(t′j)). Let Y be an (I − j)-
dimensional normal variable with mean zero and covariance matrix (tj − t′j)II−j that
is independent of X, where Id is the identity matrix in Rd. Because the Brownian
motion has independent Gaussian increments, ρa(t1,...,tj)
(
q(tj)
) ' X + Y .
If the j’th student is picked at tj , the distribution of the order statistics of the re-
maining students at tj is given by ψI−j
(
ϕI−j+1(X+Y )
)
. If the j’th student is picked
at t′j instead, the distribution of the order statistics of the remaining students at tj is
given by ψI−j
(
ϕI−j+1(X) + piMI−j+1(Y )
)
, where M = argmaxiXi.
By lemma 4 we thus have that
ψI−j
(
ρa(t1,...,tj−1,t
′
j)
(
q(tj)
))
% ψI−j
(
ρa(t1,...,tj−1,tj)
(
q(tj)
))
The above shows that the distribution of the quality of the remaining students at tj is
better if the j’th student is picked at t′j than if he is picked at tj .
60 By iterated appli-
cation of lemma 5 and the fact that the Brownian motion has independent Gaussian
increments it now follows that this relation survives to time t in spite of the fact that
at times tj+1, . . . , tk, the best available students are picked off the market. Formally,
we obtain
ψI−j
(
ρa(t1,...,tj−1,t
′
j ,tj+1,...,tk)
(
q(t)
))
% ψI−j
(
ρa(t1,...,tj−1,tj ,tj+1,...,tk)
(
q(t)
))
60Observe that the mapping ψI−j is a mere relabeling of the dimensions of the Brownian motion.
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Because the maximum is an increasing function, it thus follows from the definition of
first order stochastic dominance that
E
[
max
i∈a(t1,...,tj−1,t′j ,tj+1,...,tk)
qi(t)
]
≥ E
[
max
i∈a(t1,...,tj−1,tj ,tj+1,...,tk)
qi(t)
]
as was to be shown.
(iv) Let q(i)(t) denote the ith highest dimension of q(t). Because the increments of the
Brownian motion have full support on RI ,
P
(
qi(T ) < q(I−J)(T )|qi(t) = q(I)(t)
)
> 0 for all t < T . Hence,∑
j xj(T |T, . . . , T ) >
∑
j xj(tj |t1, . . . , tj−1), as was to be shown.
(v) For any given path of the Brownian motion, a(τ1, . . . , τk) $ a(τ1, . . . , τk−1). Moreover,
for all i 6= i′ and for all t > 0 we have P (qi(t) = qi′(t)) = 0. Hence, xk+1(t|τ1, . . . , τk) =
E
[
maxi∈a(τ1,...,τk) qi(t)
]
< E
[
maxi∈a(τ1,...,τk−1) qi(t)
]
= xk(t|τ1, . . . , τk−1), as claimed.
D.3 Proof of lemma 1
For easier readability, we use the following notation. Consider a history Ht in which k
employers have already exited at times s1, . . . , sk. We then write
φk+1(s1, . . . , sk; t) = inf{t′ ≥ t|t′ satisfies the properties in definition 1}
Moreover, we write
gk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1; t) = xk+1(φk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1; t)|s1, . . . , sk−1, t) (3)
Intuitively, gk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1; t) is the value of remaining in the game when the first k − 1
employers have exited at times s1, . . . , sk−1, and the kth employer exits at time t.
We use induction over k, starting from k = J , to prove the following lemma
Lemma 6. For any k = 1, . . . , J and for any history Ht in which k − 1 employers have
exited at previous times ht = (s1, . . . , sk−1),
(i) there exits a unique next candidate hiring time φk(s1, . . . , sk−1; t).
21
(ii) gk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1; t) is weakly decreasing in t, and is weakly decreasing in s1, . . . , sk−1
for all sk−1 ≤ t.
To obtain the entire vector of future candidate hiring times associated with a given
history Ht with previous hiring times s1, . . . , sk−1 we then define recursively:
tk(Ht) = φk(s1, . . . , sk−1; t)
tk+j(Ht) = φk+j
(
s1, . . . , sk−1, tk(Ht), . . . , tk+j−1(Ht)
)
thus finishing the proof.
To prove lemma 6, we first prove another lemma. Intuitively, in the case of n = 1, lemma
7 states the following: Suppose f is a strictly increasing function of t, and g is a weakly
decreasing function of t, and both f and g are continuous and cross at some point t′. Now
shift both f and g upwards to some fˆ and gˆ such that fˆ is strictly increasing in t, gˆ is
weakly decreasing in t, and fˆ and gˆ intersect at t′′. Then fˆ(t′′) ≥ f(t′).
Lemma 7. Let t, t˜, t¯ ∈ R with t ≤ t˜ ≤ t¯. Let Θ = {(θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ [t, t˜]n|θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ . . . ≤ θn}.
Let f, g : [t, t¯] × Θ → R be continuous functions. Suppose that both f and g are weakly
decreasing in the second argument, θ, that f is strictly increasing, and that g is weakly
decreasing in the first argument. Moreover, suppose that f(t¯, θ) > g(t¯, θ) for all θ. Define
t∗(θ) by
f(t∗(θ), θ) = g(t∗(θ), θ) (4)
if such a value exists and weakly exceeds t˜, and define t∗(θ) = t˜ otherwise. Then
(i) f(t∗(θ), θ) is weakly decreasing in θ,
(ii) t∗(θ) is continuous.
Proof.
(i) For all θ ∈ Θ, let G(θ) = {(x, t) ∈ R× [t, t¯] : x ≤ min{f(t, θ), g(t, θ)}}. If f(t∗(θ), θ) =
g(t∗(θ), θ), then because f is increasing and g is decreasing in its first argument,
f(t∗(θ), θ) = max(x,t)∈G(θ) x. If t∗(θ) = t, then f(t′, θ) ≥ g(t′, θ) for all t′ ≥ t.
Therefore, and because g is weakly decreasing in its first argument, we again have
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f(t∗(θ), θ) = max(x,t)∈G(θ) x. Because both f and g are uniformly nonincreasing in
the second argument, so is max(x,t)∈G(θ) x, which completes the proof.
(ii) Let S denote the set of all θ such that a solution to (4) exists. t∗(θ) is continuous on
the interior of S since f and g are both continuous, and it is trivially continuous on
the complement of S. It remains to show that it is continuous on the boundary of S.
For this it is sufficient to show that t∗(θ) = t˜ for all θ on the boundary of S. To do
so, define ψ(t, θ) := f(t, θ)− g(t, θ). Note that ψ is continuous and strictly increasing
in its first argument. Set T := ψ−1({0}). Since ψ is continuous, and since T is the
preimage of a closed set, T is closed. Consequently, S, which is the projection of T to
Θ, is a closed set. Now choose θ˜ on the boundary of S. Suppose that t∗(θ˜) > t˜. Then,
due to monotonicity of ψ in the first argument, ψ(t˜, θ˜) < 0. Hence, by continuity of
ψ, there exists δ > 0 and η > 0 such that for all θ in an η-neighborhood of θ˜ we have
ψ(t˜+δ, θ) < 0. Hence, by continuity of ψ, and because ψ(t¯, θ) > 0, we have that for all
θ in the η-neighborhood of θ˜, a solution to (4) exists. This contradicts the assumption
that θ˜ was chosen on the boundary of S.
Proof. (of lemma 6)
Induction anchor.
(i) Let Ht be a history in which J − 1 employers have exited at times s1, . . . , sJ−1. Set
φJ(s1, . . . , sJ−1) = T . Trivially, this is unique and satisfies the properties in definition
1.
(ii) Observe that by the above, gJ(s1, . . . , sJ−2; t) = xJ(T |s1, . . . , sJ−2, t), which is jointly
continuous and decreasing in all its arguments by proposition 1.
Induction step.
Suppose lemma 6 holds for all histories H ′t in which k employers have exited. (This is
the induction assumption.) We show that it then holds for all histories Ht in which k − 1
employers have exited.
(i) Choose a history Ht in which k− 1 employers have exited, and let s1, . . . , sk−1 denote
the points in time at which they exited. We consider two cases.
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Case 1
Suppose for all t′ ≥ t we have
xk(t
′|s1, . . . , sk−1) 6= xk+1(φk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1, t)|s1, . . . , sk−1, t). Part (iii) of definition
1 implies φk = t. This shows uniqueness. For existence, it remains to show that
φk = t satisfies the remaining properties of definition 1. (i) does not apply. If (iv)
applies, then property (ii) follows directly by part (v) of proposition 1. If (iv) does
not apply, then we need to show that (ii) is satisfied. Suppose this is not the case.
Hence, xk(φk|s1, . . . , sk−1) < xk+1(φk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1, φk)|s1, . . . , sk−1, φk). By part
(i) of proposition 1, both sides of this inequality are continuous. By part (v) of
proposition 1, xk(T |s1, . . . , sk−1) > xk+1(T (s1, . . . , sk−1, T )|s1, . . . , sk−1, T ). Hence,
by the intermediate value theorem of real analysis, there exists t′ ∈ (t, T ) such that
xk(t
′|s1, . . . , sk−1) = xk+1(t′|s1, . . . , sk−1, t′), in contradiction to the assumption of
this case.
Case 2
Suppose there is some t′ ≥ t such that
xk(t
′|s1, . . . , sk−1) = xk+1(φk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1, t′)|s1, . . . , sk−1, t′). (5)
Observe that the right hand side of equation (5) is gk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1; t′). Since the left
hand side of equation (5) is strictly increasing in t′ by part (ii) of proposition 1, and the
right hand side is weakly decreasing in t′ by the induction assumption, t′ is the unique
value that satisfies (5). By monotonicity, part (ii) of definition 1 precludes φj < t
′,
and therefore, part (iii) of that definition requires φj = t
′. This shows uniqueness. For
existence, we again show that φj satisfies parts (i) - (iv) of definition 1. (i) does not
apply, and (ii) and (iii) are satisfied due to φj = t
′. Finally, (iv) does not apply due
to part (v) of proposition 1.
(ii) As just shown, if there exists t′ ≥ t such that
xk(t
′|s1, . . . , sk−1) = gk+1(s1, . . . , sk−1; t′), (6)
then φk(s1, . . . , sk−1; t) = t′, and φk(s1, . . . , sk−1; t) = t otherwise.
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Observe that by the induction assumption, t ≥ sk−1. Therefore,
gk(s1, . . . , sk−2; sk−1) = xk(φk(s1, . . . , sk−1; sk−1)|s1, . . . , sk−1). Hence, a direct appli-
cation of lemma 7 yields that gk(s1, . . . , sk−2; sk−1) is continuous and weakly decreas-
ing in all arguments.
D.4 Proof of proposition 2
(i) We show that σ is an SPE by arguing that no player has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate to any other strategy.
Fix an arbitrary history Ht in which k employers have exited, and let s1, . . . , sk−1 be
the times of exit. Fix an arbitrary employer j who has not yet exited in history Ht.
Define for all t′ > t
yj(t
′;Ht) := x
(
t′
∣∣s1, . . . , sk−1, (tj(Ht))t′>tj(Ht),j≥k)
Note that
(
tj(Ht)
)
t′>tj(Ht),j≥k is the vector of all hiring times for history Ht that lie
in the interval [sk−1, t′).
Intuitively, yj(t
′;Ht) is the payoff (student skill) that employer j obtains from taking
an action that causes him to exit at time t′, given the remaining employers’ strategies.61
We prove the proposition in two steps.
First we show that other employers react to a deviation by employer j only in imma-
terial ways. Regardless of the strategy that employer j adopts, if, conditional on the
other players’ strategies σ−j , this strategy makes employer j exit at time t′, then j’s
expected payoff from this strategy is at most y(t′, Ht). (This is not a priori obvious,
since a failure by employer j to exit at the point in time at which he would exit under
σj could, in principle, lead to subgames in which employers other employers behave in
a way that increases employer j’s expected payoff.) Second, we show that the shape of
61Observe that yj(t
′;Ht) does not take into account that an employer more desirable than j may play e1
at some candidate hiring time tj(Ht). In this case, employer j does not obtain yj(tj(Ht);Ht) from playing
an action that causes him to exit at tj(Ht), but instead obtains limt′↘tj(Ht) yj(t
′;Ht), which is strictly
smaller than yj(tj(Ht);Ht) by part (v) of proposition 1. Hence, yj(t
′;Ht) is an upper bound on the payoff
that player j can obtain by exiting at time t′.
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y is such that employer j does not have any incentive to deviate to any other strategy,
including mixed strategies.
Lemma 8. Fix a history Ht. Suppose employer j deviates to a continuation strategy
σ′j. Let Fj : [t, T ]→ [0, 1] be the distribution of the time at which employer j exits in
strategy profile (σ′j , σ−j) in the continuation game. Then, employer j’s expected payoff
satisfies
pij(σ
′
j , σ−j) ≤
∫ T
t
y(t′;Ht)dFj(t′).
Proof. The strategies in σ satisfy the following two properties by construction. First,
for any history Ht, at each point in time t
′ at which there are l ≥ 1 hiring times, at
least l + 1 employers take some action e ∈ E such that l employers exit at time t′,
and no employer takes any action e ∈ E at times t′ that do not coincide with any
candidate hiring time. Hence, exit times depend on employer j’s strategy only through
the candidate hiring times it induces. Second, candidate hiring times depend solely
on the points in time at which previous employers have exited. Conditional on exit
times, they do not depend on what action was taken by which employer. Hence, exit
times depend on employer j’s strategy only if j exits at a point in time that is not a
candidate hiring time for the given history. Consequently, employer j’s payoff from
exiting at t′ with probability 1 is given by y(t′;Ht) if no more desirable employer exits
simultaneously. If a more desirable employer exits simultaneously, then by proposition
1, part (v), employer j’s payoff is strictly less than y(t′;Ht). Hence, the claim follows
by taking the expectation of y(t′;Ht) with respect to Fj .
Lemma 9.
(a) y(t′;Ht) has a relative maximum at each tj(Ht) with tj(Ht) > t and j ≥ k
(b) For all j ≥ k with tj(Ht) = t, we have
x
(
tj(Ht)|s1, . . . , sk−1, tk(Ht), . . . , tj−1(Ht)
) ≥ supt′>t y(t′;Ht)
(c) y(t′;Ht) = y(t′′;Ht) for all t′, t′′ ∈ {tj(Ht) > t : j ≥ k}
Proof. (a) is an immediate implication of parts (ii) and (v) of proposition 1. (b) is
due to part (iv) of the definition of candidate hiring times, definition 1, and (c) follows
immediately by part (iii) of that definition.
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By lemma 8, analyzing the properties of y is sufficient for bounding the payoff from a
given deviation strategy σ′j from above. By parts (a) and (b) of lemma 9, any strategy
σ′j whose support is not a subset of {tk(Ht), . . . , tJ(Ht)} is strictly dominated by σj .
If in strategy profile σ and after history Ht employer j exits at time t, then by part (b)
of lemma 9, employer j has no incentive to deviate to any other strategy.62 If under
strategy profile σ and history Ht employer j exits at time tj′(Ht) > t, then employer
j obtains expected payoff y(tj′ ;Ht). Hence, by part (iii) of lemma 9, employer j has
no incentive to deviate to any other strategy. This completes the proof.
(ii) Fix a (possibly mixed) SPE profile σ. We prove by induction that for any history Ht
in which k − 1 employers have exited, the kth employer exits at the candidate hiring
time tk(Ht) for this history with probability 1. We anchor the induction at k = J , and
step from k to k−1. (Hence, the induction assumption implies that for any history Ht
in which k − 1 employers have exited, all subsequent employers exit at the candidate
hiring times tk+1(ht), . . . , tJ(ht) for this history.)
To anchor the induction, suppose k = J − 1. Then, because xJ(t|ht) is strictly
increasing in t, in any SPE profile the Jth student must be hired at T , which is the
Jth candidate hiring time for any history.
The meat of the argument lies in the induction step, which proceeds roughly as follows.
Let Ht be a history in which k−1 employers have already exited up until, and including
time t. We first show that no employer will exit strictly before the next candidate
hiring time (since at any such point in time, remaining in the game is preferable to
exiting). We then suppose that with some probability, the kth exit occurs strictly after
tk(Ht). Since exiting is preferable to remaining in the game at all such points in time,
employers must put full probability on exiting in the interval of time during which the
probability that the kth employer has not yet exited is positive. This implies that the
support of each employers’ exit-distribution must have the same supremum t¯ > tk(Ht).
We then show that some employer has an incentive to deviate to a strategy in which
he will have exited with probability 1 at some point strictly before t¯. (If the strategies
are deterministic, this is the incentive to undercut the competing employers’ hiring
times.) This contradicts the fact that each employer’s exit-distribution must have the
62By definition, the current time t is a candidate hiring time only if exiting immediately is weakly better
than remaining in the game.
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same supremum. Therefore, we conclude that t¯ = tk(Ht), and thus, that at least one
employer exits with probability 1 at candidate hiring time tk(Ht)
Formally, fix a history Ht with k − 1 previous hiring times ht = (t1, . . . , tk−1) with
k ≤ J − 1.
First, we show that if t > tk−1, then no employer may put positive probability on
exiting in the time interval (t, tk(Ht)). For any history H
′
t with previous hiring
times h′t, let gk(t
′|h′t) denote an employer’s expected payoff from remaining in the
continuation game if all students are hired at candidate hiring times in the con-
tinuation game. Formally, this is defined by equation (3). As shown in lemma 6,
x(t′|ht) − gk(t′;ht) is strictly monotonically increasing, and by definition of tk(Ht),
x(tk(Ht)|ht) = gk(tk(Ht);ht). Hence, for all t′ < tk(Ht), we have x(t′|ht) < gk(t′;ht),
so that exiting at any such t′ cannot be a best response for any employer.
Second, we show that at least one employer j must put probability 1 on exiting at
tk(Ht).
For any employer j we let Fj(t
′) denote the probability that employer j exits in the
interval [t, t′]. (When we subsequently alter some employer j’s strategy, we will do
so by altering Fj . Which actions the employer will take to achieve this is defined
implicitly, from Fj and the remaining employers’ strategies.) Moreover, let J˜ denote
the set of employers who are still in the game at t.
Consider an arbitrary employer j ∈ J˜ . Let Q˜j(t′) denote the probability that any
employer other than j exits in the time interval [t, t′]. Q˜j is given by
Q˜j(t
′) = 1−
∏
j′∈J˜,j′ 6=j
(1− Fj′(t′))
Note that Q˜j may be discontinuous.
If employer j and some other employer j′ play e1 at the same point in time t′ with
positive probability, the outcome for player j will depend on whether j′ is more or less
desirable than j. Thus, it is useful to define Q¯j(t
′) as the probability that employer j
has been preempted by a more desirable employer at or before time t′. This c.d.f may
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also be discontinuous.
Q¯j(t
′) =
1− ∏
j′∈J˜,j′<j
(1− Fj′(t′))

This allows us to define Qj(t
′) as the probability that employer j is preempted by any
employer within the time interval [t, t′), or is preempted by a more desirable employer
at time t′, as follows:
Qj(t
′) = lim
t′′↗t′
Q˜(t′′) +
(
Q¯j(t
′)− lim
t′′↗t′
Q¯j(t
′′)
)
As shown just above, no employer exits strictly before tk(Ht). So for all t
′ < tk(Ht)
we have Q˜j(t
′) = 0. If the probability that some employer exits at tk(Ht), which is
the case if Q˜j(tk(Ht)) = 1, then the claim is proved. Hence, suppose Q˜j(tk(Ht)) < 1.
We now derive employer j’s expected payoff (student skills) from exiting at t′ ∈ [0, T ].
The probability that employer j manages to be the next employer to exit at the given
time t′, equals the probability that no other employer exits in [t, t′) or no more desirable
employer exits at t′. This is given by (1 − Qj(t′)). In this case, employer j obtains
expected payoff xk(t
′|ht). Instead, if j is preempted by another employer, the expected
payoff from his continuation strategy depends on the point in time s at which he was
preempted. By the induction assumption, students are hired at candidate hiring times
in the continuation game, so that employer j’s expected payoff in the continuation
game is given by gk(s;ht). Qj(t
′) is the probability that employer j will be preempted
by some other employer in the interval [t, t′], and
∫ t′
0
gk(s;ht)
1
Qj(t′)
dQj(s) is employer
j’s expected payoff conditional on this event. Summing up, employer j’s expected
payoff from playing e1 at t
′ is given by
ψj(t
′) =
(
1−Qj(t′)
)
xk(t
′|ht) +Qj(t′)
∫ t′
0
gk(s;ht)
1
Qj(t′)
dQj(s) (7)
Hence, employer j’s expected payoff from a strategy with c.d.f. of playing e1 given by
F j1 (t
′) (and F ji (t
′) = 0 for all i > 1) is
Ψj(t) =
∫ T
t
ψ(t′)dF j1 (t
′) (8)
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Now observe that best-responding requires the following lemma. (For any cumulative
distribution function G defined on [t, T ], we let supp(G) denote the support of G, and
we let sup(supp(G)) denote the supremum of this set.)
Lemma 10. For all j′, j′′ ∈ J˜ we have sup(supp(F j′)) = sup(supp(F j′′)). By exten-
sion, for all j ∈ J˜ ,
sup(supp(F j)) = sup(supp(Qj)) (9)
Proof. Suppose w.l.o.g. that sup(supp(Fj′)) > sup(supp(Fj′′)) for some j
′, j′′ ∈ J˜ .
This means that employer j′ allocates positive probability mass to hiring the kth
student to a time interval during which some other employer j′′ has already hired
that student with probability 1. At each time t′ in this interval, Qj(t′) = 1, so that
ψj(t
′) =
∫ t′
0
gk(s;ht)dQj(s). This is strictly smaller than x(tk(Ht)|ht), because for all
t′ > tk(Ht) we have x(t′|ht) > gk(t′;ht). Hence, employer j′ could do strictly better
by reallocating that probability mass to time tk(Ht).
Let t¯ = sup(supp(Qj)).
Lemma 11. F j is continuous at t¯ for all employers j ∈ J˜ .
Proof. Recall that for all t′ > tj(ht) we have xk(t′|ht) > xk(tk(Ht)|ht) = gk(tk(Ht);ht) >
gk(t
′;ht). Because
Qj(·)
Qj(t′)
is a well-defined c.d.f., we thus obtain for all t′ > tk(Ht):
xk(t
′|ht) >
∫ t′
0
gk(s;ht)d
(
Qj(s)
Qj(t′)
)
(10)
By definition of tk(Ht), and becauseQj(t
′) = 0 for all t′ < tk(Ht) (as shown previously)
we have ψj(tk(Ht)) = xk(tk(Ht)|ht).
For the least desirable remaining employer j, Qj(t¯) = Q˜(t¯). By definition of t¯, we have
Qj(t¯) = 1, so that ψ(t¯) =
∫ t¯
0
gk(s;ht)d
(
Qj(s)
Qj(t¯)
)
. By the assumption that t¯ > tk(Ht),
and by the fact that xk(t
′|ht) > gk(t′;ht), we derive that ψ(tk(Ht)) > ψ(t¯). Hence,
F j , which is a best response to Qj , must not place any positive probability on t¯, as
such a strategy could be improved be reallocating that probability to tk(Ht) instead.
Hence, because sup(supp(F j)) = t¯, as previously derived, and because t¯ > tk(Ht), F
j
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must be continuous at t¯ for the least desirable remaining employer j ∈ J˜ . Therefore,
for the next-to-least desirable remaining employer j′, we obtain that Qj′(t¯) = H˜(t¯),
and can apply the same argument as above to show that F j
′
must be continuous at
t¯. Inductively, we derive that F j must be continuous at t¯ for all remaining employers
j ∈ J˜ .
From lemma 10 we have that sup(supp(F j)) = t¯ for all j. Moreover, by lemma 11,
supp(F j) must contain (t¯ − δ, t¯) for some δ > 0 (i.e. rightmost connected subset of
supp(F j) is a non-degenerate interval). Because F j is a best response, its support
must be a subset of maximizers t′ of ψj(t′). Let tˆ be the supremum of the set of these
maximizers, i.e. tˆ = sup(argmaxt′∈[t,t¯] ψ(t
′)). Trivially, maxt′∈[t,t¯] ψj(t′) ≥ ψj(tj(ht)).
Moreover, as shown before,
ψj(tj(ht)) > ψj(t¯). By lemma 11, Qj is continuous at t¯ for all j, and therefore, ψj
is continuous at t¯. Because ψj is continuous at t¯, and due to ψj(tj(ht)) > ψj(t¯), we
therefore conclude that there exists  > 0 such that ψj(t
′) < ψj(tj(ht)) for all t′ ∈
(t¯ − min{, δ}, t¯). Consequently, sup(supp(F j)) ≤ tˆ < t¯. This, however, contradicts
lemma 10.
This finishes the proof of the induction step, and thus the proof of proposition 2.
We note that the above proof has the following immediate implications:
• No more than one employer can exit at a given hiring time tk(Ht) > t. This is
because if two employers exited, then the second would be exiting strictly before
the next hiring time, in contradiction to what was just proved.
• Employers participate in hiring frenzies exactly as part (iii) of definition 1 re-
quires: In case of a hiring frenzy, there are simply multiple hiring times at the
same time t.
D.5 Proof of corollary 1.
(iii) We construct an equilibrium in which each student receives multiple simultaneous
offers at each equilibrium hiring time, and in which the order of exit is (j1, . . . , jJ−1, J)
where (j1, . . . , jJ−1) denotes an arbitrary permutation of the vector (1, . . . , J−1). We
alter part (iii) of the definition of equilibrium strategies as follows: σj(Ht) = em if
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tk+1(Ht) = tk+m(Ht) = t and if x(tk+m(Ht)|t1, . . . , tk, tk+1(Ht), . . . , tk+m−1(Ht))
> x(T |t1, . . . , tk, tk+1(Ht), . . . , tJ−1(Ht)) + . Each employer plays an equilibrium
strategy with this alteration, and the ambiguity in part (iv) is resolved as follows: at
the kth equilibrium hiring time, employers jk and jk−1 play e1. All other employers
play s. At each hiring time that is off the equilibrium path, all employers play e1.
This strategy profile constitutes a subgame perfect  equilibrium in which the order
of exit on the equilibrium path is given by (j1, . . . , jJ−1). Since this argument holds
for all  > 0, it holds in the limit. The proof for the fact that a unique order of exit
is consistent with exact equilibrium is shown in the main text.
(iv) We prove this corollary by induction over j. To see the base case, suppose that
t′1 ≥ t1. By proposition 2, in equilibrium all employers obtain a student with the same
expected skill level. In particular, xJ(T |t′1, . . . , t′J−1) = x1(t′1). By the assumption
that t′1 ≥ t1 and because x1(t) is strictly increasing, x1(t′1) ≥ x1(t1). Because x2(t|t1)
is strictly increasing in the first argument, and decreasing in the second, x2(t
′
2|t′1) =
x1(t
′
1) ≥ x1(t1) = x2(t2|t1) implies t′2 ≥ t2. Inductively we thus find that t′j ≥ tj for
all j ≤ J − 1. Because xJ(T |t1, . . . , tJ−1) is decreasing in t1, . . . , tJ−1, we thus obtain
that x1(t
′
1) ≥ xJ(T |t′1, . . . , t′J−1) > xJ+1(T |t′1, . . . , t′J). The last inequality is due to
part (v) of proposition 1. This contradicts the fact that all hiring times yield the same
expected student skill level.
For the induction step, suppose that t′l < tl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ j − 1. Again, we
use proof by contradiction. Assume t′j ≥ tj . Then, x1(t′1) = xj(t′j |t′1, . . . , t′j−1) ≥
xj(tj |t′1, . . . , t′j−1) ≥ xj(tj |t1, . . . , tj−1) = x1(t1), where the equalities follow by propo-
sition 2, the first inequality is because xj is increasing in the first argument, and the
second is due to the induction assumption and the fact that xj is decreasing in all
other arguments. This contradicts the fact that x1 is strictly increasing.
D.6 Proof of proposition 3
To simplify notation, we summarize a vector of the form (t0, . . . , t0, T, . . . , T ) with k en-
tries t0 and k
′ entries T by (k, k′). We let xk+1(t0|k) = xk+1(t0|t0, . . . , t0), for k, k′ ∈
{1, . . . , J}. Hence, xk+k′+1(T |k, k′) = xk+k′+1(T |t0, . . . , t0, T, . . . , T ), where the vector
t0, . . . , t0, T, . . . , T in the foregoing expression contains k entries t0 and k
′ entries T .
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(i) First, we show that any equilibrium strategy profile is in threshold strategies.
Fix an arbitrary pure strategy SPE profile σ.
We show that there is an employer jˆ ∈ {1, . . . , J} such that the jˆ most desirable
employers j ≤ jˆ exit at T , and the remaining employers exit at t0. (Observe that
this implies that expected equilibrium payoffs are weakly higher for more desirable
employers, pi1 > · · · > pijˆ = pijˆ+1 = · · · = piJ .)
Suppose this is not the case. We show that there exists an employer who has an
incentive to deviate. Let k be the number of employers who hire at t0. Consider the
most desirable employer j1 who hires at t0. From hiring at t0, this employer obtains
payoff zj1(t0) = x1(t0) = 0. If he deviated to hiring late, this employer would obtain
xk+j1−1(T |k− 1, j1− 1). This is because if j1 hires at T , k− 1 students will have been
hired at t0, and j1−1 more desirable employers will compete with j1 at T (because j1
is the most desirable employer who hires early). Because σ is an equilibrium profile,
j1 cannot profit from this deviation. Hence, xk−1+j1(T |k − 1, j1 − 1) ≤ x1(t0) = 0.
Now consider the best employer j2 > j1 who is less desirable than j1 and who hires at
T . By doing so, he obtains at most xk+j1(T |k − 1, j1). By part (v) of proposition 1,
xk+j1(T |k, j1 − 1) < xk−1+j1(T |k− 1, j1 − 1) ≤ x1(t0) = 0. By hiring at t0 instead, j2
can obtain 0.
It remains to show that a pure strategy equilibrium profile exists. For any k ∈
{0, . . . , J − 1}, define y(k) = xk+1(T |k, 0). This is the expected payoff of the least de-
sirable employer who exits at T , when k employers exit at t0. Because xJ(t0|J−1) = 0,
and because xJ(t|J − 1) is strictly increasing in t by part (i) of proposition 1, we have
y(J − 1) = xJ(T |J − 1, 0) > 0. Hence, there exists k ∈ {0, . . . , J − 1} such that y(k) is
nonnegative. Let k∗ be the smallest such number. Then define the strategy profile σ
as follows: Any sufficiently desirable employer j ≤ J −k∗ exits at T and all remaining
employers exit at t0. It follows by the definition of y(k
∗) that no employer has an
incentive to deviate.
Finally, it is immediate that if xJ(T |J − 1) > 0, then the unique equilibrium is for all
employers to exit at T .
(ii) To show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium if t0 is sufficiently close to T , we
first consider the case in which student qualities do not change over time. Fix a pure
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strategy profile σ. Let J1 and J2 be the sets of employers that hire at t0 and T ,
respectively. For all j = 1, . . . , J , let yj := xj(T |0, j− 1) be the payoff from hiring the
jth best student at T . Then, the k-most desirable employer in set J1 obtains expected
payoff yk. Similarly, the k
′-most desirable employer in set J2 obtains y|J1|+k′ . Thus,
any employer in J1 earns at least as much as any employer in J2.
In this case, there are at most two pure strategy equilibria: (1) all employers hire at
t0, and (2) all but the least desirable employer J hire at t0, and employer J hires at
T . We show that no other strategy profile can be an equilibrium.
Let jˆ denote the least desirable employer who hires early in profile σ, and suppose
jˆ ≤ J − 2. Then, employer jˆ earns at least yJ−2. Moreover, employer J and J − 1
hire at T , and earn yJ and yJ−1, respectively. By deviating to hiring at t0, employer
J can improve his payoff to at least yJ−1.
Second, we consider the case in which t0 < T so that student skills do change over
time. Note that in the first case, we have derived strictly positive deviation incentives
for all but two strategy profiles σ. Hence, because there are finitely many strategy
profiles, and because the conditional expectation functions are continuous by part (i)
of proposition 1, standard topological arguments show that there exists η > 0 such
that for all t0 ∈ (T − η, T ), for any strategy profile σ for which some player had an
incentive to deviate when student skills do not change over time, there is some player
who has an incentive to deviate when they do change.
Hence it remains to show that it neither is a pure strategy equilibrium for all employers
to hire early, nor for all but the least attractive employer to hire early. If all employers
hire at t0, then employer J obtains xJ(t0|J−1). By deviating to hiring at T , employer
J obtains xJ(T |J − 1, 0) which is strictly profitable by part (i) of proposition 1. If all
but the least attractive employers hire early, then employer J−1 obtains xJ−1(t0|J−2).
By deviating to hiring at T , employer J − 1 obtains xJ−1(T |J − 2, 0) which is strictly
profitable, again by part (i) of proposition 1.
Thus, for all t0 ∈ (T − η, T ) there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Finally, we show that if t0 is sufficiently close to T , then in any equilibrium, the
employers’ expected equilibrium payoffs satisfy pi1 > pi2 > . . . > piJ . Consider any
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employer k ∈ {1, . . . , J}. From hiring at t0, employer k will obtain at least
pik > xk(t0|k − 1) (11)
(since the previous expression is strictly decreasing in k by part (v) of proposition 1,
and since k− 1 employers are more desirable than employer k). This provides a lower
bound on employer j˜’s expected equilibrium payoff.
Moreover, the sum of payoffs to employers cannot exceed pimax, defined by pimax =∑J
j=1 xj(T |T, . . . , T ). Hence, we bound employer k’s payoff from above by
pik < pimax −
J∑
j=1,j 6=k
xj(t0|j − 1)
= xk(T |0, k − 1) +
J∑
j=1,j 6=k
[
xj(T |0, j − 1)− xj(t0|j − 1)
]
(12)
As t0 approaches T , the second term in expression (12) approaches 0, by continuity
of xj . Moreover, the left hand side of (11) approaches xk(T |0, k − 1). Consequently,
the payoffs in any equilibrium approach the payoffs from an assortative matching at
T . Hence, there exists δ > 0 such that for t0 ∈ (T − δ, T ) we have pi1 > pi2 > . . . > piJ
in any equilibrium, as was to be shown.
Hence, part (ii) of proposition 3 holds for all t0 ∈ (T −min{η, δ}, T ), which completes
the proof.
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